Absolutely. This might be a long elevator ride. I'll try to keep it brief. Obviously, the title itself is a mouthful. I'd also like to just note quickly that all of what I say is my own and none of this reflects the position of the NIH or US government. Yeah. So this is a paper that I actually started writing, just as I was completing my undergraduate degree. And I've since still been thinking about it, but it's not something that I've currently been working on in my current capacity as a NIH fellow [KM: noted]. So, yes, in this paper, I basically apply one specific theory of equality, which is a Martina sense capabilities approach to this specific issue of conscientious refusal to emergency contraception. And in doing so I sort of aimed to highlight one potential strategy for how we might argue for a prohibition against these conscientious refusal policies that can hinder the over the counter sale of emergency contraception pills, at least in the US context. These policies exist in at least 14 US states using things like broadly worded conscience clauses that ended up often extending to pharmacists and pharmacy clerks who are working in non clinical settings, right, who might just be working at, you know, a Walgreens or Walmart pharmacy, and they inevitably sort of enable pharmacists and clerks to refuse to sell something over the counter like Plan B, one step based on their religious or moral convictions. And of course, this is a hot debate in bioethics outside of this particular issue about emergency contraception. Many bioethicists have done a ton of work on conscientious objection and conscientious refusal. So the sort of spirit of this paper is that sense capabilities framework, I think, has a lot of useful import in this debate, especially in helping us sort of rank our different priorities right, because many bioethicists agree and argue that we have a right to things like bodily autonomy or to reproductive choice. And those are really important to a lot of different arguments in bioethics. But similarly, a lot of bioethicists also agree that we have a right to enjoy religious expression and freedom from religious persecution. So seemingly, these sort of two things, what Sen would call a capability, these two different capabilities are at odds, which is, of course, very familiar in many debates about reproductive health care. So essentially, I try and argue that conscientious refusal to emergency contraception can create a very burdensome inequality for people wishing to prevent pregnancy, given the sort of background of historical and justices that are so apparent in the US with respect to reproductive health care access. And so I argue that that fact alone ought to sort of elevate its importance when we weigh these competing capabilities.