Now, maybe you're still skeptical, and you're saying we knew questions were about about private information. And not a lot of people have looked into that in in psycholinguistics, perhaps. So Common ground, or shandra presentations is going to do a very good job in explaining reference. And to maybe put some doubts in your head about this, we are presenting the case of the Deceitful Lego. So these are cases where in the display, this is a referential Communication task, like the ones that have been used before. And in this display, there is one object that's a normal object except the crayon. And then there's a second object. And all of you are looking at this second object and thinking, Oh, this is a Lego, because this is how we normally infer functions of objects by their appearance, except this is a Deceitful Lego. So it's not actually it doesn't actually have a function of Lego, it has a function of the crayon. So really, we're dealing with a deceitful object. Now, crucially, I know that this is Deceitful Lego. I know this is really a crayon, whereas Sarah does not how do I know that because, well, I tested it before. What's important about this situation is that the function of this object cannot be specified in Common ground. My perspective says this is a crayon. The function of this object is a crayon, where a service perspective says the function of this object is a Lego. So we do not have any piece of information to put in Common ground for the function of this object. And crucially, if you look at language production patterns, or specifically, the production of referring expressions, we don't find that people, speakers produce referring expressions that are sensitive to their own perspectives, we don't find that listed as speakers produce referring expressions that are sensitive to their addressees perspective. But rather, we find an intermediate combination of both. The next piece of evidence we'll consider comes from the literature on memory for conversation. And this was a literature that goes back to the late 70s. And it's pretty consistent, and that the summary that we can take away from that literature comes from studies where they have people come together to have a conversation. And then after delays have anywhere from about five minutes to three days, they say surprise, recall everything that was said, or in other cases, they use recognition memory procedures. And there's two central findings that are relevant to the present situation to present arguments. One is that after a short delay, so five minutes to three days, people can recall from anywhere from about five to 40%, of what was said, which is quite low. The second piece of information, and perhaps the more important one is that there is a strong, egocentric bias. So there's about a two to one ratio, approximately of what you can remember such that people are much more likely to recall and successfully recognize things they've said themselves, compared to what was said to them. And so here, we want to ask, what are the implications of this asymmetric representation of the discourse history for language use? Okay, and so, here, what we'd like to argue is that on the basis of these memory findings, it would suggest that distinct representations of the discourse history are the basic basis of conversation. So here in the circles, I'm representing, on the left of those memory for the discourse history, and in Brandon, illustrating that it's biased in terms of her own contribution. So mostly, she's going to remember what she said, she'll remember a little bit of what I said, But mostly, she'll remember what she said. And I'm similarly going to remember most of what I said, and very little of what she said to me. And so if we imagine what is even possible in terms of shared representations of what was said, it's a very small piece of the pie. So while it's been long known that these representations of conversation are ecosummit egocentric and asymmetric. Here, what we want to do is pivot and ask, okay, well, what are the implications of these distinct and asymmetric representations for language use? Now will point out that ever since the idea of common ground and has been introduced in the literature by people like Clark and Sal Necker, there has been this idea that Common ground is represented distinctly in each person's mind. Here, we want to say, Okay, well, what does that mean for a theory of language use and the role of perspective in language.