Well, thank you very much, Bill, and I want to thank you and Emily for the opportunity to talk on today's panel, and on this what I think is an extraordinarily important and set of issues and very timely, as Alene pointed out, very, very timely. It's great to be on a panel with with Jason and Eileen. It's a great honor to do that. So thank you very much. Let me step back for a moment and sort of run through a little bit of the history and Bill you touched on a lot of these things. But I think it's maybe useful, because it seems to me, part of the question about global cooperative involvement by the US and by others is really about impact. You know, what is it that's trying to be accomplished, and perhaps showing my age, undoubtedly showing my age, I go back to the famous Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace by John Perry Barlow back in Davos in 1996 in which his view at The time, which was not a crazy view. Quite opposite. It was actually, I think, quite a well established view. Was just, you know, that talking to about the governments of the industrial world, as he called it, he would say, he said, you know, leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. So the point there was, and Bill Clinton, President Clinton, made a similar point when talking about the internet in China and so forth, saying, you know, it's like trying to nail jell o to the wall. That is, the sense back then was that the internet so fundamentally different that, in fact, it would elude government control in many respects, including the free flow of information and the like. That view of the late 90s. Mid to late 90s didn't last, and it didn't last because it turned out not to be realistic. Was not the way the internet operated. We ended up in the world summer for the Information Society, which had it was in two phases, the UN business, as we like to call it. And the first phase was in Geneva, in 2003 the US tried very hard to establish a global principle about what we might call internet freedom now, and not surprisingly, we ran into a lot of resistance. We were able to talk about the declaration, a Declaration of Human Rights, and use that an article 19 as the basis for it. But in order to get that in, which was in paragraph four of the Geneva declaration, we were able. We had to also put in paragraph five, which basically was the other side of the Declaration of Human Rights, which reaffirms the role of governments in these areas. So we were pretty unsuccessful, I would say in trying to advance that ball. And I think it's probably worth remembering that WIS is itself was, you know, a watershed event in terms of the relationship between the international community and the internet. It was, I think it's fair to say, originally sold to the international community, including to the United States, as being a discussion about how the Internet could be used to further the human condition, how people can benefit from it. It, of course, quickly devolved, in my view, from that very lofty view to be in a fight over I would you know ICANN and the role of the US government regard to the internet, something that we jealously protected and continue to protect across administrations. But then we got to the Tunis phase two of the of with us, the tuna Tunis Agenda near I have to say, I'm a little disappointed in the sense that we did something which I thought was actually extraordinary, but we turned out not to be very important. But at the time, I was very proud of it, very, very conscious of it. In paragraph 42 while everyone was focused, including us, on ICANN and the like, and fighting the US hegemony in the area of the internet and the like, we were able to get in what I had tried to get in, basically in the Geneva phase, which was paragraph came paragraph 42 which was a re affirmation of the global commitment to the freedom To seek, receive, impart and used information and the dissemination of knowledge. And unlike what we happened in Geneva, there was no second part to it. There was other than a reference generally to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There was no countervailing role of government associated with that from a national security so in some respects, I think it's not unfair to say that might have been from an international perspective, where we had the global community recognize the importance of what we might call internet Freedom in a fairly unfettered and UN abridged fashion, as you mentioned, you know, then in 2006 things started to change, and it was really driven by the success of China, the Great Firewall, and some of the actions that were being taken against some of the companies, including Yahoo At the time, who was very active in China, and so Secretary Rice put together what we called Git, which is the global Internet freedom Task Force, where we explicitly used the term internet freedom. And it was really a time when internet freedom became sort of a term of art that was used and advanced greatly, and that was used very aggressively for the remainder of the Bush administration, and then, as you pointed out, that ratcheted up greatly, in my view, and appropriately during the Obama administration by Secretary Clinton, who made this really a key part. And then that continued through including, I would say, through the Biden administration and the strong support for internet freedom technologies and the like. But the point I think I'd like to sort of emphasize is, and I part of the reason I started with with the borrow quote, the audience has changed over the time. It went from back in the 90s, where governments weren't supposed to be the audience at all, because they weren't supposed to be involved, to a decade or so of the governments really from a multilateral perspective, where action was at the UN, at the ITU, the International Telecommunications Union, in Geneva, regional meetings and so forth. Now my sense is that the world has continued to change, and that although there's a lot of activity in places like the UN including a review of with this every 10 years and so forth, and a lot of discussion about that. And Bill, you touched base on some of that, that for a variety of reasons, that's not where the real action is. And by action, I really mean what impact it has on individual lives, and what we've seen now, it's not abrupt, it's been changing for years, is that it is really the focus has gone to individual governments and those every region, Europe is different than the United States and how they think about the free flow of information. China is different. Russia is different, Iran is different. The Middle East writ large is different. The Americas are different. You know, there's a and so the focus, it seems to me, has shifted over the past few years from multilateral statements of common views to now a focus on individual governments and what they are doing and what they are promoting or restricting. And so I think what I see happening going forward is that we are going to, as a practical matter, evolve quite apart from who is in the White House, we're going to be refocusing. Need to refocus more on what might be viewed as bilateral discussions, of trying to convince governments one by one as to what the approach is, recognizing that the United States will probably always as we have been unique because of our first America, first amendment to first America amendment heritage, quite zealous on these issues, where domestically and therefore often internationally, but to Be more bilateral and more specific in how we interact with others and try to convince them. And I think we will see what this administration does on these questions. As people have already pointed out, there's reorganization of the State Department. There's obviously refocusing being done. One can argue that it's more isolationist and so forth. But it's another way of also saying it's more focused in certain ways, and less and less