Yeah, and that's a really complicated question, so I'll try to be as concise as possible. So the term back door refers to a system or component in a program that is created, often without knowledge of absolutely everyone who creates those programs, because it's compelled by a governing party, perhaps for compliance, perhaps for legal purposes, etc, in order to undermine the assertion of confidentiality that that that tool would, otherwise, you know, claim to have. And so, for example, and especially. Actually an example where we know that back doors are a bad idea. Back doors have been baked into a number of technologies for decades, if not longer. But just recently, we saw that, you know, the very system that ensures compliance with legal legally obtained pen warrants, meaning like you can tap someone's phone in AT and T that had been used by hackers, by like state actors hacking for another another country in order to surveil people's phone calls. That's an example of why back doors always go wrong, because as much as you would love to comply right, because you have to those very back doors in the hands of the attacker are going to totally like undermine any assumption, any assurance of security and confidentiality and privacy. So back doors in general are just a horrible, horrible idea. Now there are companies that do resist that with very, very stated principles and also with stated limitations around the type of data that they have access to, in general, that makes, you know, any effort to compel an organization to implement a backdoor, kind of moot, which I think is really admirable, and that's also when we are recommending tools to people. It's not just use signal because of this, or, you know, use Tor because of that, or whatever, because they're cool and we like them or whatever. I mean, it's not only that. It's actually the fact that these are technologies that are scoped in such a way to prevent technical back doors from being possible. And we can get into like, you know, as to why, but I think that that's beyond the scope of this particular conversation. But this is where it gets complicated, because given that end to end, encryption is what they would like to call facts on the ground, it's not going away, and we love it like we're keeping it like everyone loves end to end. Encryption, even its opponents, they still use it. They love it. What we're looking at now is not necessarily technical back doors, but legislative back doors. And so when you think about, you know, a a push, not only in the United States, but in a number of countries. In like, you know, the BRICS nations legislation proposed by the EU via what is called the DSA or Digital Services Act or agreement, or whatever, these are all examples of attempts for or attempts to compel under the guise of, like, you know, moderation, trust and safety, like you know, data sovereignty, all of these, like really, really excellent things for platforms to have language being crafted in order to overly give governments the ability to access this otherwise confidential data. And so there, while we don't necessarily see this yet, but if you think about, you know, the ability for a robot to be able to jump into what you thought was like a confidential, end to end, encrypted group chat, for instance, under the guise of, you know, trust and safety, meaning, like, Oh, someone said something crazy in the chat. Let's put a bot in there, and then all of a sudden that that chat is now like, ostensibly, back door. That's an example. Or, you know, data being having to be stored in servers in a certain country where you want things or where you want to like operate. So, you know, a foreign government can grab user data in order to further surveil their their population that's using another country's service. That's another example. Or like, you know, in the near future, what is going to happen where AI lives on every single one of our devices, and you know, on your own side, without breaking your end to end encryption, you still have aI enabled processes that can you know as possibly read the entire contents of your Super, super secret secure chat. So this is, I think, what is at stake and why we pay so much attention to the way these various legal languages are crafted.