so let me start by saying this is a highly classified program. And therefore I'm going to be limited in what I can say or all the information that, you know, I may have available. We're also a five person board. And so I'm just I'm just one member. But given what I have seen, and what I know, I do have several concerns about a clean reauthorization without significant common sense, reforms to safeguard privacy and civil liberties. And I sort of start with the premise that incidental collection is a major issue for the program. And by incidental collection, we're talking about the operation of a program that incidentally collects us person communications while targeting foreigners abroad for their communications, we don't have a number on the number of US persons that are impacted by this since 2014, the board has recommended that the NSA develop a methodology and release the number of US person communications collected under the program. But thus far, they failed to do so. So we know that there's a large number of US persons that are ultimately caught in this in the operation of the section 702 program. We also know that there's a massive number of queries of US persons on the collections that have been targeted as part of the program. And so in the most recent public report, the FBI reported that it had queried 3.4 million searches of the of the 702 collections for US persons or or, you know, that were labeled as us as US persons 3.4 million. That's a lot, a lot for a program that is designed around, you know, targeting the communications of foreigners to suddenly 3.4 million queries that have happened there. And you do have to wonder, you know, what, what are these used for, you know, what are these 3.4 million queries that have been taking place? And, you know, are they Is there a value to them, thus far, we have minimal to negligible examples of the value of a 3.4 million queries of US persons in this particular in this particular system. And I want to distinguish between the value of the program in targeting foreigners abroad, and especially, you know, for foreign intelligence, national security purposes, terrorism, anti terrorism purposes, distinguish that from actually queering it for us purposes, right when you're now searching it not for, you know, something necessarily over here, but now of US persons and whether, you know, when you're operating in the United States, a different lens ought to apply there. We have a large number of compliance issues that we are that we've seen over the years, and, you know, these compliance issues particularly around us, person queries are quite significant. We're talking about you know, you know, querying this, these, the 702 database in particular by the by the Bureau For derogatory vetting information, for example, you know, querying for participants in the FBI Citizens Academy, which is, you know, a group of business and civic and religious leaders that are working to understand the role of law enforcement in their communities, but queering them through the databases, querying individuals who provide tips, or report themselves as victims of crimes, querying a local political party query and a US member of Congress queering social security numbers, again, in a database that was designed to target the, you know, the communications of foreigners located abroad, that suddenly now we're looking at office repairman, and queering, someone who's coming in to the bureau, for example, to repair, you know, some, some some broken facility there, for example, to actually query to make sure they're not in the data set. I think that these are all compliance. And so I'm not making any, these are all public, these are already out there. They've been reported in the public. But those are some of the examples over the years that we've that we've seen. And in this, you know, even Matt Olson, the Assistant Attorney General, for National Security Division last week himself recognize that, you know, and I'm quoting, every compliance incident matters, of course, but incidents involving US persons information are especially damaging to public trust. Even he recognized the the the large number of compliance incidents over the years that have resulted from us person queries. So we don't know how many people are involved. We know there's a massive number of queries, we know that there's a substantial number of compliance incidents that are at issue. And so how do we address these? You know, in my view, first of all, we need to finally, you know, ensure through a congressional mandate, that there is a requirement to estimate or to calculate the number of US persons who are ins whose communications are incidentally collected as part of the operation of section 702. There's an interesting report that's come out of Jonathan Mayer's lab at Princeton, which has set forth a process for estimating that that may be one to consider. But it's it's it's, it's far time to require that to be done. Secondly, we need to be better at knowing which communications actually involve us persons. And I believe a common sense way to do that would be to tag us persons, when you tag a record or communication as a US person communication, when an analyst becomes aware that it is a US person, so that that flows through to every other person that season also triggers certain other retention requirements. Thirdly, we've reached a point where it's time for to consider the the necessity of a prior court order before querying, you know, section 702 collections for US persons. That is an important safeguard that could be put in place. And it seems to me, given the the number of compliance and incidents given the relative, you know, lack of value that's been explained for queering without a warrant for us person queries that that seems viable. Fourthly, we've talked you mentioned a little bit about about Congress in 2018, when it reauthorized it, you know, the, you know, made a provision that if the NSA were to resume about collection, that it would notify Congress before doing that it hasn't done that. But I do believe it needs to be codified and into about collection. And we need to be clear about applying to both downstream and upstream communications. And then finally, we have to solve this issue called batch job queries, which are queries where it's where an FBI agent, usually, it will query the entire collection 400 1000 2000 people all at one time with one justification. The risk there is that if that error if that query is inappropriate or wrong, suddenly 2000 people or 10,000, or 100,000, are implicated by this, the the the FBI has reduced it to to that number to 100 before getting approval, but I do have concerns about whether there's any ability to at all do batch queries in a way that would be consistent with the President's new executive order on signals intelligence from last year executive order 14 086, which contains unnecessary, unnecessary and proportionality requirements. For all signals intelligence activities, it is hard for me to imagine that there's a way to justify bulk you know, batch searches in a way that's necessary and proportionate.