That's a good question. I thought about that a lot, especially as I was writing the final chapter of the book. I can just take each of those actors in turn, what can parties do to prevent the commander in chief test from distorting the politics of US foreign policy, I think the obvious thing there is to nominate presidential candidates with substantial military experience. So as I mentioned, particularly with respect to the John F. Kennedy example, the main reason many political leaders have to do this thing in which they adopt overly hawkish foreign policies to build up their credibility as commander in chief is because they don't have other resources to draw on. Specifically, they don't have a track record that will convince voters they're an effective commander in chief. Eisenhower had that track record. And that's part of why he was one of the most restrained foreign policy presidents in modern history. He was quite aggressive at limiting the rise of defense spending. He kept the United States out of Foreign Wars. He took a lot of criticism for that, but that criticism couldn't really dent his image or his military reputation, because that was so well established. So I think I think parties have an incentive to do that, particularly Democrats have an incentive to do that if they want to avoid hawkish foreign policies. What can candidates do? I think candidates have two ways that they can try to redirect some of these distortions. One of them is that what I call rhetorical bellicosity in the book. One of the innovations that Donald Trump brought to us politics was that even though he departed from the foreign policy establishment views in many ways, he couched that in this super hostile rhetoric about how two generals didn't know what they were talking about, and foreign policy establishment was corrupt. And that allowed him even when he was breaking from certain orthodoxies on let's say, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to couch that in a very aggressive rhetoric that I think helped him to maintain his reputation for leadership strength and doing that. Contemporary progressives do a lot of this as well. So if you if you listen to Elizabeth Warren or Bernie Sanders talk about foreign policy, they also have this, like quite sharp hostility towards the foreign policy establishment. So I think if you don't want to orient your foreign policy around confronting other states, confronting the foreign policy establishment, you got to confront somebody, voters, voters need to see that. Another example I talked about in the book comes from George W. Bush's 2000 presidential campaign, in which he critiqued Bill Clinton, for having conducted a disorganized and undisciplined foreign policy, in which he argued that Clinton had just sort of gotten sucked into all these ad hoc conflicts around the world, particularly in the Balkans, because he didn't have a clear idea for what he wanted to do in foreign policy, and therefore, he kept taking his eye off the ball and quote, so I think that that argument could be useful to the notion that continually expanding American foreign policy isn't leadership strength, it's weakness, it's it's a lack of discipline. That was a pretty successful argument for Bush in 2000. Now, obviously, Bush ends up radically expanding US foreign policy after September 11. But without that, it's you know, it's possible he would have been able to rein that in. And then last McCain, what could voters do to prevent these distortions? I think there are two things there. One is to ask for the details on what candidates actually intend to do. So particularly When candidates talk about confronting other states like China, it's really easy to let them be vague about that. And they want to be vague about that, because they don't want to go into details that could alarm the public. And I think that kind of lack of investigating the details allows candidates to make these sort of vague, generic seeming postures that can end up having real consequences, but don't necessarily expose them to challenges for lacking good judgment. So simply asking follow up questions. Asking for details later is important. Finally, just honestly, the most fundamental thing voters can do to reduce these biases is to stop personalizing foreign policy issues. I it totally makes sense as to why voters would want a competent commander in chief. And frankly, it's it makes for good TV to talk about, you know, who's, who's strong and who's weak and who's up and who's down. But I don't think it's particularly productive. And I think part of what the book does is hopefully what it does, is to show that this guy of personalizing foreign policy into turning policy issues into referenda on presidential candidates personal traits, has some real underappreciated consequences that should make us think think a little bit more carefully about whether we should keep our conversations more oriented towards substance.