Well, first of all, it's it's it's hard to imagine there's two years already and it's been two years of your tragedy for Ukraine and do a really unbelievable burden on Ukrainian people heading to a significant a much lesser degree on the on the Russian people. And when this war started, satellite and many others are thinking, you know, this is this is kind of an extraordinary act of self harm for Russia to go and invade neighbor and embark upon what has turned out to be your was potentially a Forever War, right, a war that really doesn't seem to have any obvious end to read and inflicting huge costs upon it upon Ukraine, but but also upon its own population. So why is it what is the what are the factors that are going to drive Russians attitudes to the war, and they certainly many of us saw at the beginning, that there were there will be a rise in the Soozee Azzam early on that typically is the case is arrive on the flag that happens in these contexts, but that two factors would really drag public support for the war down over time. And the first was the economic costs of the war, which we thought were going to be very high and when the US and the Europeans moved very quickly to impose sanctions that looked like it was going to be the case. Second, were casualties from a war that Russia would not be very tolerant of high casualties that resulted from the conflict. And yet what we've seen is support for the war has remained really buoyant. And the best you can tell from from surveys is that I'm still well over 50% That's good for Putin remains extremely high, and that the initial surge of support for for for the war for Putin hasn't lived off much. So why what's what's what's driving this one? In our reserves, the reserves of there's sort of two factors one is a psychological factor, which I think helps to explain the resistance to the impact of casualties, which is that a lot of Russians are very accepting of the war as part of Russia's mission in the world. So one of the ways we did this is by asking, revisiting psychological concepts, constructs concepts from our context. So from this particular case, we're really interested in something called system justification theory. Which is a fancy name for people being willing to put up with a lot of stuff in the name of their country. Right. This was originally a process identified by John George is a psychologist at the New York University, and he used it to explain what you think of as, What's the Matter with Kansas. Why should why is it that people who don't do particularly well on the American economy, nonetheless, are very supportive of actual policies, the policies that are, you know, the division of wealth upwards, and we'll just just argue that essentially that there's a certain kind of person who really buys into the system more than into there were one individual benefits from the war. We've adapted this to the Russian context. We create a lot with one of my my students, what cannot be created a whole series of questions that focus in on Russian his willingness to identify with the state, even though they recognize Hearthstone, we ask them questions like you, Russian, the Russian authorities are weak, but they're the best that we can go for life in Russia as harsh where it makes them stronger. Russians are poor, but the more spiritual, this kind of sort of double edged sword and as of support for the regime. And what we find is that that is the single best predictor of of support for the war. It's also a predictor of willingness to take more casualties in the war. So people who are hiring system justification tend to be pretty thick skinned, and they're not tolerant. We're not sensitive to casualties or tone of psychiatrists. We're willing to spend more money on the Worland than we recite the factors all play into this sort of stuff to support for the war that seems pretty much robust to the costs are willing, much more willing to punish people for opposing the war, for example, those factors are really, really powerful. The second initial efficacy is add to the economic costs, do the same thing that we did this time. Have you always done if you underestimated the our ability to impose economic costs on Russia through sanctions? The Russian economy is always it's never as good or as bad. As Western. We've seen it. And this gets me underestimated their ability to adapt to a sanctions economy with their ability to find new sources to sell oil and gas. But even more important, another ability to switch your words to a war based economy really, really quickly. And Russia is at least according to lots of anecdotal evidence that we hear we actually experiencing some kind of an economic boom, in the sense that wages are up and demand for labor was up. It's harder and harder and harder to get people to, to work in stable industries, because private sector wages are up to minute. So they're not the sort of manpower shortage, economic growth, kind of, like Keynesian militarism, as some people have called it. Right. And we didn't take this into account and I think those two factors have really reduced the impact of the main things we thought we'd be driving Russian support for war.