It's a good question. I mean, I think there are many, many parallels. As far as I know, as far as I understand, the US hadn't much interest in the Soviet experience, thinking that very kind of war will be very different. They developed more interest for the Soviet experience with time, as they became as well stuck in fighting in Afghanistan. And this idea of parallels, I though quite a bit. It's I think, to kind of understand to which extent there is a repetition of mistakes is fascinating. Because you would think that wars are different. And there are obviously quite a lot of difference. But the parallels in the warss and the mistakes made by the two superpowers fighting in the same place are very much notable. And I will mention a few here because I had tried to kind of, again, not not all of them, but I think the key idea is the United States, both, like the Soviets had this belief that they would impose their own development model on Afghanistan. And surely, it's different from the communist model, in some ways, but it's also this idea that they would come they would offer this development model, they will promote it, including by force, and that people will support it because they want progress because they want running water, because they wanted electrification, infrastructure, healthcare education, and that just by building that, you will aggregate support from the African population, and investment that was kind of forced forced for modernization or rapid modernization, it it's very similar between the two. And both times it hasn't worked, you could say, maybe it was obviously more heavy handed from the Soviets. But a lot of that infrastructure building generates all of that industrialization is very similar and has failed both times. And both times, the forces which came had and there was quite a lot of stories you could find about that it in the book about the Soviets had no knowledge about the context. They didn't really bother about studying Afghanistan in advance. And they actually even sidelined the people who knew about Afghanistan. So It's true, because the idea was that well, the communist playbook, in like the dogma should work more or less the same way anywhere. This is the idea behind the the communist thing is that it's it's reproducible. You could have it here, you could do it again, it's good with anywhere. And so you don't really need to adapt anything to the context to Islam to just you come and you do it like, like Marx. And so there was also this belief in in the western idea, like democratization, but also this kind of progress, it should work. You don't have to do much context adaptation. And so you don't have to, they're all saying you don't have to really know about what what in groups or where the language is, or what the religion says or what's the trajectory of the traditions are just come, and you do infrastructure projects, and then you have a lot of other powers, you have this idea that being so ideological and dogmatic, the Soviets never really tried to coopt too much of the opposition in the beginning. This would come much, much later on, you will think it could we separate the people who are very much ideologically bent on fighting us from people who we could bring in some kind of coalition government, with the Afghan communists. And they were opportunities early on which we didn't exploit. And then it was too late, the same for the United States, a lot has been said about not being able to split the Taliban early on from the ones who maybe have been, would have been amenable to talk with a pro US government, from, for example, the al Qaeda and the radicalized groups who were absolutely bent on fighting until the end. You could think about the idea that being both quite ideological, you didn't have any kind of exit strategy. The Soviets didn't have any kind of benchmark of like, what would look like the end of the Soviet project in Afghanistan they came thinking it was for a few weeks, then it was for a few months. And 10 years later, they were leaving. Much like the Soviets did, the States came without a clear idea of how long this commitment will last and it lasted for 20 years. And so this idea that when you don't have a real project or real state building project and you don't know what the milestones are, was very similar. The difficulty of managing their Afghan allies that's that's a fascinating one and a very fun once the Soviet struggled in imposing any kind of discipline. On the Soviet on the Afghan communists of trying to reconcile you had always been fighting you had always corruption, always a lot of problems. With the problem being that you could not easily change them. You're more stuck with your local allies, and they actually have much more agency. But it was often found in the literature before that, because they know from time they know the context much better. They know the local situation much better. They know actually what to say, to Soviet allies to orient their activities in a certain direction. There's high turnover among the Soviets. So every time a new person comes, they're very much dependent on local, on the local communists and so on. And you could not really replace the person in charge, without making it look like a failure. And as I'm telling that story, obviously, it resonates very strongly with with the American experience, where you had a similar situation, we have a lot of turnover, where even you have very much disappointment with the Hamad Karzai at the time, how would you replace him or his ministers, whoever you can't, and so we are stuck in that situation. Over time, the role of Pakistan has been much analysed as well, it was obviously an enemy in Soviet times. But even if it was an ally of the United States during the war, it still was a sanctuary for the forces opposing the Americans. And so in that sense, is this kind of the more for the military buffs, but this idea that, quote unquote sealing the border, it was very much central to military operations in both wars, that you could not win in Afghanistan, if you're unable to control the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And in both wars, they tried, and they basically failed at finding a way because they never had enough troops to divert to prevent the movement across the borders are fighters, for example, that would come go to sanctuaries, replenish, come back, and so on. And so this was also the problem. So there are a lot of them. And maybe one one, I will I will come to to to, again, is also the one about Islam, is that we disregard to Islam tradition, context, it was also present in the in the American war, the Americans had not much idea about Islam, they didn't think about adopting anything, we didn't think about coopting Islamic into the regime, assuming that it was important. And like the Soviets, they by default, left the claim to Islamic legitimacy to the opposition. And the Mujahideen had it fighting the Soviets and the Taliban had it fighting the Americans, saying that we are actually Muslim warriors training for an infidels who are here to destroy Islam, and not being able to address that claim, that very central kind of dichotomy claim about the war was a major problem for the Americans. And they have tried, but it never kind of worked out. And so I mentioned just a few here, I could do a lot more. But it's really fascinating how these wars resonate. They obviously also differences, right? I think one of the, the central ones I will just end on that is that, like the for the Soviets, I mentioned that window in 80/81. The window for the Americans was a bit clearer for the Soviets maybe was a window, but when the Soviets came to kind of prop, a falling communist regime, or comments within which was already very much struggle, which was present before the Soviets came, but which was struggling, they didn't have much popularity, or they had some popular support in communist quarter, but not much. And then they lost it very quickly as they started bombing against, I think, the honeymoon and kind of the popular support enjoyed by the US forces and the allied forces, I'm guessing it was longer, that you actually had a year and a half, two years from 2000 to one, maybe 2003, when you had a lot of enthusiasm from the American project. But you actually had a real possibility to turn things around after the Taliban defeat. And then you you had popular support, and maybe this is a major difference. But that was a bigger chance of success.