Yeah, absolutely. I mean, I think it's worth saying that we analyze the four cases in terms of that continuity or change question, as Ramon said, so we're interested in where did each of the countries start from, and where are they now, and how have they been sort of path dependent, or how have they been sort of contextually rational, consistent with their own practice. And in that, we look at, you know, labor markets. How have labor markets been purposefully adapted or changed to enable or encourage startup activity? So, for example, in in Japan, we see the loosening or the enabling of of pension fund portability. So until the end of the 20th century, you wouldn't leave your your comp, your sort of salary job, because it would mean losing your your life savings. Until that point, we look at the way in which financing is enabling startup activity or encouraging the product. Dominant, if it's a large firm, centric innovation system. So, for example, the the boost of venture capital. So in the the Japan and Korea context, as Ramon sketched those domestic aims, you know, employment creation in recent years, the sort of inclusion that can be across the country, so to enabling more activity across Japan, for example, geographically, boosting more venture capital in Japan is an interesting one that it's we see a huge growth in venture capital, but the venture capital is coming from Japan, Inc, if you will, large companies and the main banks in Taiwan and China, similar. It's a persistence of, you know, the prevailing sort of starting system, but starting from different places. So Taiwan, as a developmental state, it was always a bit different in the sense that it's SME focused. So large small firms were the thrust of innovation capacity in new technological frontier areas. And there was that sort of security motivation for many years, and we see that persist over time. We see it ever more enabling labor markets, more equity funding, more venture capital available in Taiwan. But a move where the technologies and the disruption, let's say it's not in in the Taiwanese case, it doesn't become about supporting semiconductors and TSMC, right? So in Taiwan, it stays persistent in the sense that the point of startups for Taiwanese policy is to build new and emerging technology capacity, which is really interesting, because maybe there would have been that tendency to say, well, startups become resources for our silicon shield or Something like that. And in the Chinese case, there's sort of hybrid movements over time. And we make in the case in the book that it depends on the technology in the sector as well. So Ramon mentioned semiconductors in the critical technologies across the cases, but especially in China, startups can be purposed to support, you know, government backed or large firms in other sectors, say, platform economy, and depending upon the sort of political cycle, you'll sometimes see that sort of mark one much more competition centric mode of startups are really As Kai fu Lee terms it, which I love, this phrase, the gladiatorial entrepreneur, right? So, really competitive, really out there to disrupt. So in China, we see expansive of equity investment for startups. We see the increase in the sort of point being about economic security or the external that Ramon mentioned, but then it depends on the technology, the sector, and sort of what's happening at a particular point in time.