1869, Ep. 115 with Rachel Whitlark, author of All Options on the Table

3:05PM Mar 7, 2022

Speakers:

Jonathan Hall

Rachel Whitlark

Keywords:

military force

nuclear weapons

leaders

book

iran

nuclear

case

rachel

nuclear proliferation

kennedy

iraq

united states

preventive

adversary

beliefs

historical

international politics

deep dive

north korea

israel

Welcome to 1869, The Cornell University Press Podcast. I'm Jonathan Hall. This episode we speak with Rachel Whitlark, author of All Options on the Table: Leaders, Preventive War, and Nuclear Proliferation. Rachel Whitlock is Assistant Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Whitlark's articles have appeared in Security Studies, International Studies Quarterly and International Studies Perspectives. We spoke to Rachel about why certain leaders opt for preventive strikes against states attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, while other leaders do not, the psychological mindset that is generally present in leaders who do pursue such military operations, and her insights on two nations who have consistently been in the news regarding their nuclear programs, North Korea and Iran. Hello, Rachel, welcome to the podcast.

Thanks so much for having me. It's great to be here.

Well, I want to give you a congratulations on your new book, All Options on the Table: Leaders, Preventive War, and Nuclear Proliferation. Tell us the backstory behind this book. How did you...what inspired you to write this book?

Thanks. So I am, I was exposed inspired by real world events in the 2000s. So this was before I was a PhD student just live in my life working out in California, and events were unfolding that would ultimately inspire my PhD dissertation. And now this book. So if we go back to 2003, the United States as we'll recall, invaded Iraq, ostensibly because Iraq was attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. And so the United States spent, you know, dollars, blood, treasure, political capital, etc., on this, what would turn out to be long and bloody war. But the year before in 2002, the international community learned that Iran was also clandestinely pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and yet the United States didn't intervene. And so this sets up a puzzle to me, both Iran and Iraq were or are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and who had pledged not to pursue or acquire nuclear weapons, and both yet were caught doing so anyway, sort of in contravention to their treaty obligations. And these are seemingly analogous cases, in many ways, right?...large, Middle Eastern non-democracies, hostile to the United States and US allies, US interests...and military force was used against Iraq, but not Iran. And I found that strange. This puzzle gets even worse, though, if we fast forward until 2007, when Israel destroys a nuclear reactor that was being built in the Syrian desert, despite at the time and for the last five years, saying that Iran was the major threat to Israel in the international community because of its illicit nuclear program. So here we have another data point, again, seemingly analogous cases seemingly similar cases, Israel facing two Middle Eastern non-democracies, adversaries for Israel, who are both caught pursuing clandestine nuclear programs, despite their Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT obligations...Israel attack Syria, but not Iran...what gives? Right? These events, this variation in the behavior that I observed just as a citizen of the world watching world events, sometimes states like the United States, and Israel use military force against adversaries who they catch pursuing nuclear weapons programs trying to build nuclear weapons. And sometimes they don't use military force? In those very same circumstances. This was very curious to me. And this was the puzzle that I set to explore in what is now my new book.

Nice, nice. And so...that's great. So to understand the puzzle, let's look in the past. So you looked it took some historical examples and put the puzzle pieces together? What were these historical examples that you used in your research?

Sure. So this book does a very deep dive in three cases of us decision making against China, North Korea, and Iraq. So those are the three main case studies that are the three main empirical chapters in the book itself. And in each case, since I'm ultimately making an argument about the role of leaders, and how we have to understand leaders, and in particular their beliefs about nuclear matters, in order to understand the answer to this puzzle that I set out to explore ultimately...when military force is used or considered and then used. And so in each case, I compare two successive presidents and presidential administrations. So John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson, in the Chinese case, George HW Bush and William Clinton in the North Korean case. And then George HW Bush, Bill Clinton, and also George W. Bush, in the Iraqi episode. So then I also move beyond the US context, and I test my argument that I have just built in the US case in the Israeli decision making environment. So I also examine Israel's behavior against Iraq, Pakistan and Syria. And here I explore the beliefs and the decision making of Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin, Menachem Begin, and Ehud Olmert. And so the way that I put together the cases in each of these episodes that and exploring each of the leaders I just mentioned, I go through historical archival documents, personal materials, going back as far into the earliest lives of these leaders, or these people even way before they become leaders. And I look at that personal record, as well as their decision making records from once they ultimately become the national executive, the president or the Prime Minister, as well as comparing journalistic accounts, contemporary accounts, as well as the secondary academic literature, from political science, history, etc, etc. So I take all of that material, and I do a very deep dive to see what motivated these humans, when they were young and way before they were even entertaining the idea of becoming, you know, their national leader. And I investigate what they thought about how international politics works, where do threats manifest, and how best should we respond to those threats when they manifest in international politics. So I define what I call their nuclear beliefs, specifically, their views about how nuclear weapons matter for international politics writ large, as well as what nuclear weapons in the hands of a particular adversary might mean for the national security and foreign policy of the state. And I use those beliefs to predict how leaders are likely to behave and engage once they become president once they become prime minister. So the book is a very deep historical tour in the three US cases, and then in a smaller way, the Israeli episodes. But you also asked me about perhaps my favorite historical anecdote of everything that I do. And frankly, that's on page one of the book. It's the story that opens the entire thing. And it's in 1963. It's the summer of 1963. So it is the height of the Cold War, right, the Cuban Missile Cuban missile crisis has only just happened a few months ago. And John F. Kennedy sends Ambassador Admiral Harriman to Moscow. And he goes to Moscow with the express purpose, express instructions of talking to Nikita Khrushchev, who is the premier of the Soviet Union. And Harriman is meant to assess Khrushchev's willingness to engage in a joint operation a joint us Soviet military operation to target the Chinese nuclear program that is in construction at this time. And this kind of blew my mind, right. These are sworn enemies. And here we have Kennedy serious enough about the threat that nuclear weapons in the hands of the Communist Chinese poses to the international community into the US itself. And so he wants to see if Khrushchev is interested in talking about the possibility of joint military action. This is not, of course, the first time that we've seen sworn enemies cooperate, where mutual interests can be identified. But the fact that's that the threat was so significant to President Kennedy, that he thought about the possibility of a joint military option against China. That, to me, was one of the most fascinating and perhaps coolest historical episodes that I discovered, of course, it doesn't come to pass, right? Khrushchev is not interested. And then Kennedy is assassinated just a couple of months later, but it's sort of

That's amazing. That's mindblowing that that would happen. It reminds me there's that medieval saying, you know, the enemy of my enemy is my ally.

That's exactly right. And of course, we get loads of, you know, cooperation in arms control and other things. And, you know, later in the in the Cold War period, but the fact that this was even something under discussion was just like,

wow, yeah, that is so cool. That's so cool. And so, so you, you mentioned deep dives, and you know, looking at the beliefs of these leaders like that, that's what's really amazing about your book is that you're challenging the conventional wisdom in the field which generally is like "the state is doing this..." and you're saying no, well, that's true, but at the same time, we have individual leaders that are constantly changing, or not necessarily, some of them are in power for years, but of the importance of that individual in the larger scheme is maybe overlooked. And your research is rectifying that and showing how important it is. Your research shows that there is one particular type of individual one particular type of leader that is more likely to do a preventive strike. Could you kind of parse out what that type of leader is? And perhaps an example?

Sure, sure, absolutely. So those nuclear beliefs that I described, right, I have two of them. And the these form if we can get a little political sciency here, the independent variables of my argument, and I call them a leaders beliefs about the general consequences of nuclear proliferation in the international system, and then also about the particular challenge that a specific nuclear adversary, once armed with nuclear weapons might pose. And you know, these two beliefs, first of all, very individual to individual, which is not necessarily obvious, right, as you said, and well noted that international relations and political science as an academic discipline has largely privileged the role of the state in these big questions of national and international security, so that I'm focusing on leaders. And I'm able to demonstrate that leaders actually and people have very different beliefs about what threats are in the international system, how they manifest and what we should do about them. And in particular, my argument suggests that leaders who are both what I call nuclear pessimists, borrowing from the political science literature, those who see additional nuclear proliferation as negatively consequential, dangerous or damaging to international politics writ large, and also who confront a, an adversary, who they believe will be unable to be deterred, once they acquire nuclear weapons from negatively undermining the national security, the foreign policy objective, the interests of the state at large. So if you have a leader who is both of those things, a pessimist generally about nuclear weapons and their spread around the international system, and particularly concerned about their inability to deter that newly nuclear actor once they become armed with nuclear weapons, from undermining their own national security interests, or, and or their foreign policy interests, threatening our allies, making it harder for a state to achieve their goals in international politics, regionally or globally, that's the kind of leader who my arguments suggest should be especially likely to consider. And then also, if circumstances are such that it makes it advantageous to do so then use preventive military force as a counter proliferation strategy. And so you also asked for an example. I'll give you one both in the US context, and then also one from the Israeli context. There are there are more in the book. So John F. Kennedy is one of these leaders in particular who is my argument suggests going to be seriously likely based on his earlier nuclear beliefs formed when he was a young man way before he was even entertaining the possibility of becoming president of the United States, he should be especially likely to consider and possibly use military force against the Communist Chinese when Kennedy becomes national executive. And indeed, is that historical anecdote I told you about suggests he was very serious, serious enough to talk to not only the Soviet Union, but also our Taiwanese allies, about the possibility of joint military operations. Of course, history intervenes, and Kennedy's assassination, assassinated, excuse me, so we don't actually know what he would have done. But I speculate in the book that he would have been seriously inclined to continue that pursuit and might even have use military force, but not for his untimely death. And then also in the Israeli context, Menachem Bagan is one of these leaders who fits this particular type, seriously likely to consider the use of preventive military force against adversaries pursuing nuclear weapons, and indeed he does. In the Iraq episode, he bombs the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. And most people don't know he, he at least entertained and had conversations with potentially the British and the Indians about the possibility of military action against Pakistan. That didn't happen but there's at least record that he was thinking in the same way

Wow, that's fascinating. So is there you know, we're now looking at the modern day and the new cycle is crazy. There's constant news all over the world, it's hard to keep track of things. But are there any touch points? Now, with this historical research that you've done that you have your eye on? You know, I'm just gonna keep my eye on that, because that looks like a potential problem or or not a problem? What do you see?

Definitely. So I think there are actually two that I was I am watching close closely in the current environment. And the first is North Korea. And then the second one is Iran. North Korea, I watched for a slightly different reason, which is that people like to talk about the current situation with the North Korean nuclear program as similar to those that I described in my book, those that I investigate, but I actually think that they're quite different. Most importantly, because since 2003, North Korea has had nuclear weapons, and since that time, has tested them, and they are of increasing sophistication over time, and so those who would discuss or consider military action in today's environment against North Korea, that's a totally different beast than the type of episode that I explore in the book, I am only looking at the use of military force to prevent another country from acquiring nuclear weapons and in the North Korean context, for better or worse, that cat's already out of the bag. So we would be looking at a very different military operation, one that would be designed to roll back and existing arsenal. I'll also say that I do look at the North Korean case, historically, in the late George HW Bush administration, and the Clinton administration, and in the 1990s, in 1994. In particular, Bill Clinton got very, very close to ordering a preventive attack to forestall North Korean nuclear weapons acquisition. Wow. It was even in 1994, expected to be a brutal military operation, with millions of people potentially killed in North Korea, South Korea, Japan, potentially, you know, American troops and the whole bit. So it was a very unpleasant military operation to consider in 1994. Fast forward some 25 odd years where they are a nuclear armed adversary, and it would be potentially infinitely worse. So it's worth thinking about how those situations are different, facing a nuclear armed adversary or trying to stop somebody from acquiring nuclear weapons. And that's sort of a long prayer that preamble to the Iranian situation currently potentially yield something more analogous. Right, if you're watching the news, right now, there are ongoing discussions between the international community the US, most importantly, perhaps, and Iran, about the possibility of returning to some kind of a negotiated framework following on the prior joint complaint, comprehensive plan of action. The previous deal struck between Iran, a few other states in the United States under the Obama administration, the US left that agreement, and Iran has continued advancing their nuclear program. Now, we don't know what's going to happen. With the current negotiations, we may see the return to some kind of framework that will limit the advancement of the Iranian program. If that doesn't happen, we don't see a new deal struck. Or if we do see some sort of a deal, for the time being, but then in the future, a new Iranian leader could decide to race to a nuclear weapons acquisition, we might once again see either American or Israeli leaders considering using military force to stop them from getting nuclear weapons. It's also worth pointing out that the American intelligence community, the Israeli intelligence community, a number of other international actors, currently say that Iran shows no sign of an active nuclear weapons program. They had one before, but right now they have a civilian nuclear program. If that changes, right, if the intelligence changes if a future Iranian leader makes moves to race towards nuclear weapons acquisition, we might see some future American leader or future Israeli leader especially if they pose this those nuclear beliefs that I described is so important in for leading leaders to be especially likely to consider the use of military force to stop someone else's nuclear acquisition. We may see these conversations return to the foreground, but we're gonna have to stay tuned and see what happens because perhaps we may get a negotiated framework in the various A near term that would take considerations of military force off the table, at least for the time being.

Yeah, yeah. And it's interesting. Thanks for sharing that. Because, you know, just looking at the news, you see little tidbits of obviously not a full scale military attack, certainly. But there's this whole Cold War going on with Iran, where the special operations are going in and assassinating top scientists, or there's the, the computer malware that's put in to the like, they're constantly mucking up the works. So they don't have to do any type of serious invasion or Syria strikes. But they're just nipping the bud consistently like a tree to prevent it from blossoming.

Absolutely. The Israelis actually have a term that they use, usually in the counterterrorism context about mowing the grass. metaphorical, if you want to call it that way, about the need to routinely nip threats in the bud, so to speak, to continue with our

nice gardening metaphor.

Yes, exactly, exactly. And so we see something similar here, but you know, raises a really important point, which is that the use of military force, as I talked about it in my book is merely one tool in the counter proliferation toolkit. And there are many other tools that the Israelis and the Americans and many others have drawn from over time.

Alright, nice. Well, we encourage everyone who's interested in this topic to do the deep dive that Rachel did with her research for her new book, All Options on the Table: Leaders, Preventive War, and Nuclear Proliferation. Thank you so much for talking.

It has been a pleasure. Thank you so much for inviting me on.

My pleasure. Thank you. That was Rachel Whitlock, author of All Options on the Table: Leaders, Preventive War, and Nuclear Proliferation. Follow Rachel on Twitter, at the handle @Rachelwhitlock. If you'd like to read Rachel's new book, visit our website at Cornell press cornell.edu and use the promo code 09 pod to save 30%. If you live in the UK, use the discount code CSANNOUNCE and visit the website combined academic .co.uk Thank you for listening to 1869, The Cornell University Press Podcast