it. You are piling everything in as much as they can on the premise that July and August are going to be dead months. When? When has that happened? When has that happened in recent memory? Definitely, no. I it'll probably slow down a little bit. It'll we're getting a release out the door, and I think there'll be a lot of vacation for us. So how often are you how often are you putting out major releases, we end up in about a six month cadence is what I'd like to be, a little faster. But six, six months seems like about the Yeah, about the case. It's the right. I was going to say customers get a little cranky if you start coming out a little too often with release. Yeah, they usually would be happy if we spend more time testing it. And the last one we did out of was very bumpy out of the gate. So, I mean, we, we did a major security refactor in it, and so that, you know it, it had rip ripples that kept, kept surfacing for a couple of weeks. So that was, that was a big deal. You know, it was the security thing's really cool. We, oh my goodness, um, we have a token. We generate tokens, obviously, for permissions to operate the system. When we built the system, originally, we gave the machines a token that had very high access into the system to perform, to perform tasks. On the right, it's the agent. It's doing the thing, the challenge becomes, if you can grab that token, then you can impersonate the machine, and you have high access. And so we've been, you know, there wasn't a lot of alternatives for a long time, but about three years ago we maybe more. We added the ability to have a every task as a unique token. So so when you run our system, it generates hundreds of tasks to accomplish, and each task can have bespoke security permissions. So that way, each task has the minimum access is supposed to have in the system, right? We hadn't gone as gone back and said, Oh, now we don't need the machine token to have as much permission. We can tighten things down quite a bit more. And so we went back and made it so that we had least privilege tokens in all operational context, which is, it's, it's a hugely powerful statement, and it's, it can have profound implications if you have a task, yeah, made an assumption about having bigger permissions than it didn't. So we had a lot of work getting all those pieces. There was, and there were some other changes we made to backups or something. Anyway, more details than probably, right, right about, yeah, I mean, anytime. You're messing with a something as as deep and as kind of in the mix, as as as you know, security is that that gift that keeps on giving, right? You know, you never you never done. You're never done. It's so hard that, and like the HA capability is, we have a requirement for ha to be completely internal. So we can't just move ha into a database and, say, set up an HA database. So how? I mean, how difficult must be. And this is a, this is kind of a one of those questions, but how difficult it must. I often think about how much, how difficult it must be for you guys to do testing, given that, you know, it's not like you have this, you know, enormous warehouse full of, you know, every piece of hardware that you're you're going to be dealing with, and in all of the configurations that you must deal with. I mean, it's just, it's got to be it's got to be crazy. We're actually building a bigger hardware library to automate testing against a lot of those pieces, to catch, try and try and catch more and more of them. Even if we had it, our customers have their own configurations. So, you know, we don't, we don't the hardware, since we're just using the vendors tools, right? Ultimately, it's the customers configuration through the vendor tools. We're just orchestrating that. So there are places where we can help them, or we can catch stuff, and we do there's also times when it's just like those bio setting Yes, the vendor has to tell them that the bio settings will work or not. Does that? Does that make sense? So yeah, I want us to do a way better job of what I'm what I'm starting to call pre cognitive bugs, right, borrowing the term from Minority Report, right? The right. I mean, this is, this is, if we can catch something before you know that we should have been able to catch before it went into the field. I call that a precog, a precog bug, so I want us to, I'm asking us to track things as a company of, you know, oh, we should have caught that. That shouldn't have surfaced in the field. And it's not like traditional bugs where it's like, oh, we coded something wrong. Fixing that, I think, is just fixing a bug. It's, it's Dell changed the, you know, this happens all the time, super micro, top offender, you know, their new version of the management tool, bios, management tool has a behavior change from the last version. Yeah, and we that that we should be able to catch, detect and fix. So it's not a matter of, hey, you know, you've got six models of super micro gear, and one of them has a whatever it's we've got four versions or 10 versions of the super micro BIOS management tools. And there's, you know, when they rev it, we should be pulling that in, testing it through a battery of tests, and then identifying that something changed in their tooling. And that's what I mean. So a pre cognitive bug is we know, we know our customers are going to pull in this new whatever, you know, Linux distro, as soon as it, soon as it's out, you know it's coming, right? You know it's coming. They're going to hit this. If we can fix it before they hit it, then we've that's a precognitive win. It's not a, it's not a it's not a defect, it's a it's an issue. You'll accept the shade of gray distinction between the two pieces. So I'm calling those precogs. Yeah, go ahead