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Evan- Venezuela Strike Analysis | Otter.ai

Evan- Venezuela Strike Analysis

Emel Akan29min

Unknown Speaker

00:02

A test, test, test.

Emel Akan

00:22

Hello. Evan Ellis, hi, Evan. This is Emel Akan from the Epoch Times. How are you

Speaker 1

00:28

very good. Thanks for Thanks for your interest in my in my perspective. Happy to give whatever help I can.

Emel Akan

00:33

Thank you so much. I appreciate it. And I know it's too late, but I'll try to keep it short. I just want to, I just would like to know you can hear me. Can you hear me? Hello, can you hear me? Hello, I can hear you. Evan, I can hear you very well. Can you hear

Unknown Speaker

00:50

me? I can hear you now. I lost.

Emel Akan

00:53

I hope it's okay, because I am not using my internet, I guess. But are you in a Can you hear me now?

Speaker 1

01:00

Well, I can hear you. I can hear you now, well, wonderful. Okay, I'm actually yeah, I'm actually yeah, I'm actually in Dominican Republic. So it may be that there's some weird thing going on with me.

Emel Akan

01:12

I see. Okay, so I would like to know if there will be any, I mean, from your from what you hear from other people. Do you expect any strikes soon land strikes in Venezuela?

Speaker 1

01:24

Of course. I mean, you know publicly it is, you know, it's not. You know, clear you know whether President Trump has made the final decision to do so or not. Certainly made a number of statements to suggest that, you know, he has decided, or he's moving in that direction, you know. But I think if you look at the number of of different indicators, the indicators seem to point in that direction. I mean, number one, if you are going to do a major operation, you know, it it's helpful to have the on land against Venezuela, it's helpful to have the forward carrier, carrier battle group there, because that allows you to generate high levels of sorties. Certainly, exercises have been done, completed in Trinidad Tobago. This past week, the President's indicated that, you know, he's committed to CIA operations, which is, logically, what you would need to do if you're trying to negotiate with with the people who would, you know, cooperate to help you bring Maduro and other cartel de la solace leaders to justice. You know, there have been certain public pronouncements. The President himself has been publicly briefed on military options and has indicated at least provisionally, that he has made a decision. So certainly, there's been, in my opinion, we have the if we're talking about either limited land operations against, you know, a particular, you know, carto delicious targets, or if we're talking even about a major operation to you know, simultaneously bring, you know, the entire cartel, delicious leadership to justice without necessarily, you know, Doing a, you know, a, you know, an occupation of Venezuela. But I think for both of those two options, we certainly have the force capability there. The things that we deployed make sense in terms of what you would need for doing that type of operation. And again, you have the indicators from what the President has said, and, you know, the types of things like the you know, like the like, like, the like, the exercises that you know. So it's, I can't see anything that is stopping that from happening in the near future, and I'll stop there, but yeah, so I think I just gave you a very elaborate Yeah, I don't know, but it would make sense.

Emel Akan

04:06

Yeah, that's, that's perfect, because that's what we are also hearing. And just wanted to ask you follow up questions on that, if they decide to do this land strikes in Venezuela, inside Minister, how will that change things you know, do you expect the regime change as a result of this.

Speaker 1

04:24

So when we say land strikes, I think there's a wide variety of possibilities there. And so if we're talking about limited land strikes or land actions, so that could be launching five to Homa hawks at a at a in an airstrip or an individual will occur till the listeners, Commander linked with sending drugs, a you know, Special Forces operation to go in and grab somebody. But, so if you're talking about limited operation. The question is, you know, maybe not.

Speaker 1

05:35

Because, you know, I don't want to have to answer for all the things that I've done, and you know, but once you believe that US action is imminent and will be successful, then your calculation changes to okay, even if I'm worried about this, I better switch sides to save my own skin. And so my point with all that is, if you're talking about limited land strikes that may or may not have the effect of getting a critical mass of people who support to that point, if you're talking a major action, a decisive operation to essentially eliminate or grab, you know, the majority of those curricula. So this leadership target, I think that type of thing would set into it. It might not be that the US is explicit, explicitly looking for regime change. I think President Trump has been very clear about that, but I think it would likely set into motion a change of event, a chain of events, that would lead to the significant possibility of the restoration of the democratic, you know, the legitimate, elected regime of Gonzales, although would also create a high risk of of violence and chaos and in the infighting And so in the reason I say that is that in the absence of those of those key figures, especially when that action came from an overwhelming and US strike, even the military at lower levels, everyone knows that the new Gonzalez was overwhelmingly elected. I mean, they've got the ballot receipts from 80% of the ballot boxes. Improve it. And so in the absence of that higher level leadership, I think there's a natural gravitation to the legitimate leadership. Now the problem then comes is, you know the promises that you you know the pardons that you have to give to the leaders when they turn and fight for you after they've been involved in narco trafficking. People, some people who are some pretty questionable characters, the number of people who are who just don't want to see a return to accountability. I mean groups in Venezuela, like elements of the FARC and the ELN and Simplot, those and certain radicalized members of the National Guard, et cetera, those people are going to try to sow chaos, as they publicly announced. It's not going to be an insurgency. It's going to look like Colombia fighting against the FARC. It's going to be bad actors are trying to do terrorism to, you know, essentially destabilize the government, blow up refineries, sabotage infrastructure, and essentially, you know, can you protect enough of that input, and, you know, basically keep them from destabilizing the economy and prevent things from just fragmenting and turning into the violence and so, so that I get to a high likelihood that there would, you know, that that large operation would produce, you know, some significant change that would probably give a window for for, you know, the legitimate government to take power, but with a high risk that the violence and fighting would make it really difficult for them to

Emel Akan

10:18

Yeah, that makes very I understand it's not going to be too easy, and I had a few questions, but my recorder is has stopped, but I'll continue anyway. But so the about the legality of the strikes, do you think they will be able to do it? I mean, is that legal for the administration to do this kind of attacks if they choose to do the land strike this time.

Speaker 1

10:49

Well, I mean, I'm not a, you know, I'm not an international lawyer, as you know. I mean, the administration's position is that, you know, with the designation of this is a terrorist group, and with the support of a number of different US partners, I believe Argentina, Paraguay, Ecuador and Peru, and there may be others. You know that also recognizing these groups as terrorists, that the position is that you know that this terrorist designation creates a de facto authorization for the use of, or permissibility of useful legal force. I think it's, it's reasonable to acknowledge there are a lot of people, both in the US and elsewhere, that find that chain of logic unpersuasive. But, you know, but I think, I mean, that's, that's clearly the case that the administration is making. But I think whatever the whatever the legal question, I think the perceptions or concerns that people have is going to be a factor that the administration will continue to have to address, because, just like the UK suspended certain intelligence sharing, just like Colombia threatened to do so those those perceptions create consequences, including by us adversaries such as China that are looking to paint the US as an aggressor or bully or or things like that. So. So I think, without taking a position on the the actual legality, I think clearly that perception is consequences that it's important for the administration to to continue to address for a number of

Emel Akan

12:33

Orions, interesting and Caroline Levitt, the press secretary today, said that we view the murderer regime as being illegitimate. So I guess this is another confirmation that they want a regime change. So So is this kind of a signal that they really want to change? The end game is to change the regime rather than just targeting the drug trafficking.

Speaker 1

13:00

It's interesting. And let me. Let me respond two ways. Number I mean, number one, I don't the fact that it, I think you can make a strong case for the fact that it is illegitimate. I think Secretary Rubio said the same thing. You know, the fact that you have overwhelming evidence that you know, that you know Edward gos was, was the victor. I mean, again, they had, you know, tally sheets from 80% of the Venezuelan from the July 28 2024 Election Day. They, they basically have to prove, but so, but to me, that's not a regime it obviously that leads you to regime change, but, but to me, that's also an international legal argument, because if, if you're if you're going after a government that you believe is at least the legitimate government, then you know, to some degree, you can argue that you are engaging in war, but if you are going after a group that you do not say is legitimate government, but it's just military occupying territory, which, in this case, happens to be all of Venezuela. That is consistent with the administration's argument that this is a state of non international armed conflict. And clearly, you know, Gonzalez government has been supportive of, you know, us action against, you know, so, so this is it's although regime change would seem to follow. I actually interpret that as more of an the administration's legal argument on the legitimacy of the strikes, more than an argument about regime change. If that, if that makes

Emel Akan

14:37

sense, sure I understand very quickly. Okay, that's interesting. And how much oil is really important in this. I mean, does this have anything to do with oil. I mean, the Trump administration focus on Venezuelan oil.

Speaker 1

14:50

I mean, honestly, I mean, I see oil as a a positive of resolving this, but it's not the primary. I mean, yeah, Venezuela has more proven oil reserves than any other country in the world, including Saudi Arabia, although it's the quality of oil that sulfur content is not that great. But at the end of the day, I mean, you know, it say that there's more oil on the market actually, you know, takes away from the revenue that you get from the US oil export industry, you know. Now, I think there are a lot of interested parties, you know, from you know, oil traders like Harry Sargent to Chevron that would love to have access to that oil. And I think if you get a, you know, I think if you get a regime that's willing to give us companies access to that oil, you know, you can certainly call it a, you know, the administration can call it on those accounts. And, oh, by the way, it means that, you know, the democratic government of Venezuela can basically pay for the cost of the use, you know, just like we're trying to get the Europeans and Ukraine to pay for the cost of of that war, rather than suggest that the US would have to, essentially, you know, pay for the cost. But, but I don't see this in kind of, you know, political science, you know, international relations, you know, leftist theories of us, foreign policy, 101, you know that this is, you know, the, this is all about the US getting access to Venezuela as well. I mean, I see this as I mean, to me, to me, what it's really all about is, is that a number of different significant threats to US interests have long come out of Venezuela. They include drugs. They include, you know, the effect of massive out migration. They include Venezuela serving as the primary partner for Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, China, and other anti us actors in the region. So you know, so you can say, well, is President Trump focused on the drugs and migration portion of that threat, whereas perhaps Secretary Rubio is more receptive to the extra hemispheric actor hosting portion of that threat, and at the end of the day, it's President Trump who decides. But I think it's possible to recognize that there are, there may be different people within the administration, while recognizing the Trump always is one who decides, but that can get to the same conclusion that you need to eliminate the state of having this group in control of a country to is the is it necessary to stopping that harm to the United States? Now, did I just show you regime change? Kind of but the point is, it's not inherent. It's not to me, it's not inherently about democracy in Venezuela. It's about, you know, it's not about restoring the legitimate government. You know, it's not about a crusade for democracy per se. I mean, it's about stopping a threat to US interests. Now, are there some within the administration that believe that the best way to do that, and the right way to do that is to, you know, have the democratically elected pro US government in power? I would say absolutely yes. If that happens, Will everyone you know in the administration declare victory and say this is a good thing we've achieved? I would say absolutely yes, but maybe, again, maybe I'm being too subtle. But between the I don't see that TC stopping the harm and the need to take this group that's in control of Venezuelan territory and make that stop. I see that as the the path, and not necessarily the the idea of, of necessarily, you know, restoring the legitimate government, restoring a democratic government, it gets you to the same place. But to me, it's a different logic, because it opens up the space for, you know, if, if your goal is to to get this group that's causing threat to us interest to stop other solutions short of, you know, just the restoration of the legitimate democratic government, if that makes any sense. And to me, that's, that's where you have the back and forth of, Well, is he negotiating? Does he want to talk with Nadu? Is he because, I think at the end of the day, President Trump, at least in my in my analysis, he's motivated by stopping the harm, rather than necessarily. I mean, I think oil is a plus, democracy is a plus, but it's, it's not at the core of of, at least in my analysis,

Emel Akan

19:51

what we're trying to achieve. I see, Okay, wonderful. And there were some people arguing that the the reason why US forces are partially there is because of Maduro may invade, sorry, my pronunciation for your oil with China in the mix, is that something that you agree with,

Speaker 1

20:10

you know, that's another bonus. So, so prior to all this in these past couple months is, you know, without going into the dispute, Venezuela claims two thirds of Guyana's territory, and those and that two thirds that it claims. And of course, Guyana's Defense Force is maybe a 20th the size of that of Venezuela, and it doesn't have all of the fighter jets and things like that. I mean, it makes the imbalance between Russia and Ukraine, you know, look like an even match, you know. And so, you know, for guyan, it's an existential thing that, you know, Venezuela claiming two thirds of its territory. So, and also, I think there's reasons why Maduro, it's probably a bluff, you know that he's been trying to, because that's the one rallying cry that ironically, Maduro and Venezuela's own antimatter opposition, both kind of agree on this, this historic claim to is key but, but the fact that you have this massive presence, I would say this makes the Guyanese very content, because it means that you know you're probably not going to get a Venezuelan invasion of iskibo, while you have these massive US forces in the region. And frankly, the same thing with Trinidad and Tobago with, you know, there's been a lot of criticism of the very pro us stance of the new UNM Kamala percent. This is there, but, but if you look at it from a trend and Tobago perspective, they are seven miles off of Venezuela's coast. On the on the east side, you've had, you know, massive impact of Venezuela out migration. You've had massive impacts of crime and piracy. And so in a sense, they are happy that the US is there too not. It's not because they morally agree or disagree with what the US is doing, but essentially to having a big force that's checking a neighbor that is, you know, been essentially making them very uncomfortable, I think is welcome so. So to me, the US isn't there because of that, but the fact that the US is there makes both of Venezuela's previously threatened neighbors feel a little bit more secure. If

Emel Akan

22:35

that makes sense. Yeah, it makes sense. And last question, I know we talked a lot, I took too much of your time, but heck, said recently discussed the administration's concerns about cartel activity in Mexico, and emphasize that the President is determined to confront it. And do you expect anything in Mexico after this one?

Speaker 1

22:54

Well, I think, Well, I think at the end of the day, you have, we have very different relationships with Mexico, Colombia, in Venezuela. I mean, in Venezuela, you have a regime that we don't regard as legitimate, and it's been working actively against US interests. In Mexico, you have a regime, you have a government that we do regard as legitimate, and Claudia shangbaum Arguably, has a really good relationship with President Trump. There is us frustration that maybe Mexico is not doing as much as it could against drugs, but, but I think shine bomb has made it very clear that, you know, unilateral us action on Mexican territory is a big red line. So while I've heard, and I heard, you know, President Trump's hypotheticals too, and I think often it's taken a little taken a little bit of out of context. So I mean, I think and we've actually had good military cooperation with Mexico. So if I had to guess, I would say that it's most likely that, you know, us, pressure and desire for Mexico to do more could lead to additional areas of more collaborative, military cooperation. And clearly, there's signals being sent to Mexico. The US wants more Colombia, which ironically previously one of the us's closest partners in the region. And even though we do regard Gustavo Petro as legitimate, if you've probably seen what just came out in Karakol today, I believe it was that, you know, here you have active members the federal government in his own military, collaborating with different elements of criminal groups, passing them Intel and Things like that. And so, you know. So you know, could it be a situation where, in a case like Colombia, you could have some type of us action on Colombian territory? Possibly. So I think what I'm saying is that that you get different likely outcomes in each of those three cases. I mean, clearly there's a pressure, a desire by the US for more to happen in each one of those three cases. But I think where that gets you in each of those three cases, at the end of the day, you know President, you know Trump's hand comments be what they may but, um, but I think where that gets you, it probably comes out a little bit differently in Mexico, which is probably going to be a more, in my judgment, is most likely to be more of a collaborative answer. And certainly in Venezuela, it's tending towards something very different.

Emel Akan

25:36

I think that the you know this whole, you know, focus on homeland, and you know, anything closer to Homeland like South America is going, is going to be huge focus for this administration. Is that understanding correct?

Speaker 1

25:53

Yeah, and to me, to me, I think there's an intersection of two different things. For me at the level of President Trump, my sense is the focus is defined by things that directly benefit or harm us, residents. And so, you know, issues like, you know. And so the countries that are proximate to the United States, you know, Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean is our southeast maritime approach, you know. So our, you know, our trade relationship, you know, through usmca are, you know, the flows of migration, that the flows of drugs, so that, that gets you that, that that approach, I think there's a broader attention to the hemisphere which is consistent with that, but, But I think also reflects kind of the receptivity to the hemisphere of the people that you have. Secretary Rubio, Deputy Secretary Chris Landau, the fact that also state has a lot more influence vis a vis DOD and National Security Council in terms of kind of policymaking than, arguably, it did bring the first administration. I mean, President still decides, but And so it's interesting to kind of see how that you know within state, you have the people at the highest levels are, you know, Latin Americanists who are from and know the region well, and so. So I think kind of what you have is this kind of intersection of the President very focused on those things that immediately impact the United States, and people on his team that have a in depth understanding of the opportunities and problems of the region. And so I think so, I guess what I'm trying to say is you, what it gets you to is a one level, an emphasis on stopping things that harm the United States immediately in ways that maybe we didn't have before. And then, more broadly, okay, how do we have a more intelligent, or at least a, you know, have more attention to the Americas, but what it doesn't get you is a concept of, okay, let's have a America's co prosperity sphere where we invest in the region through charitable programs and building infrastructure and things like that. So because I think a lot of people when they think, okay, there's going to be more focused on the Americas? This is not, this is not the more focus on a region that one thinks about us, foreign policy going back central

Emel Akan

28:36

particular. Does that make sense? Yeah. Wonderful. Yeah. Thank you so much. I appreciate it. Thank you so much for sharing all those insights, and I will share the link when we publish it. And Fantastic. Thank you so much. Happy to help anytime. Have a great trip, and we'll be in touch. Thank you very much again. Ivan,

Speaker 1

28:56

my pleasure. Thank you. Take care now. Bye.

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