1869, Ep. 145 with Luke Griffith, author of Unraveling the Gray Area Problem

2:40PM Jan 18, 2024

Speakers:

Jonathan Hall

Luke Griffith

Keywords:

inf

missiles

inf treaty

reagan administration

ss

book

carter administration

talks

unraveling

control

treaty

arms

europe

soviet

reagan

deploying

carter

gray area

20s

nato

Welcome to 1869, The Cornell University Press Podcast. I'm Jonathan Hall. In this episode, we speak with Luke Griffith, author of the new book, Unraveling the Gray Area Problem: The United States and the INF Treaty. Luke Griffith is Professor of Government and History at New Mexico Junior College, where he specializes in US history, Western civilization and the American government. We spoke to Luke about his research on the US government's role in the origins and the demise of the intermediate range Nuclear Forces Treaty of December 1987; how President Reagan's success in securing the agreement was made possible by earlier work in the Carter administration; and, what has been the state of nuclear arms control after the US withdrew from the treaty in 2019. Hello, Luke, welcome to the podcast.

It's great to be here. Thank you so much for having me, Jonathan. It is an honor.

Oh, wow. Well, same to you as well. It's an honor to have you on and I'm excited to talk to you about your new book,Unraveling the Gray Area Problem: The United States and the INF Treaty. Tell us how this book come to be.

Well, I started this project about 10 years ago, when I noticed the gap in the scholarship about the origins of the intermediate range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Academics had studied the role of the United States and the dual track decision. That's a US and NATO program to couple missile deployments in Europe, with arms control talks with the Soviet Union, or previous academics had analyzed the Reagan administration's role in the INF talks with the Soviets. Therefore, I wanted to create a comprehensive history of the US role in the INF Treaty. My research also gained new relevance in August 2019, when President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the deal. In my opinion, that was a bad decision for the United States, but it was quite good and beneficial for my academic career. And at the RAND Corporation, extended my history of the INF treaty to cover its demise, as well as the current situation with Russia and the People's Republic of China. And then my book really came together during my postdoctoral fellowship at the Ronald Reagan Institute, where I was fortunate to interview key players from the Reagan administration, people like Secretary of State George Shultz, and I was able to submit a successful book proposal to Cornell University Press.

Nice, nice. Excellent. Well, thanks for doing all that. We're glad to have the book out and available and the research that you found. So stepping back just a second, you know, the title of your book Unraveling the Gray Area Problem. Tell us in the listeners tell us what is the gray area problem?

Yeah, that's good that that too, is a good question. It's important in a book to define your terms early on. So I think in the second or third paragraph, I do that. The gray areas created in arms control, a military and a political problem for the United States and its NATO allies. From an arms control perspective, the gray area problem refers to the emergence of new lethal types of nuclear weapons that were excluded from arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late cold war. Given their limited range and nuclear capability, gray area systems were omitted from Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, assault, and mutual unbalanced force reductions and B F R. And in particular, my research focuses on the Soviet SS 20 ground based road mobile missile. It's a system that embodied the gray area problem from a military standpoint, with a range of about 5000 kilometers and three independently targetable warheads, the SS 20 could wreck targets throughout your Asia within minutes. In fact, American strategists predicted in 1981 that 100 SS 20s denial ate every significant military installation in NATO Europe, and by the mid 1980s, the criminal had deployed 441 SS 20s. The gray areas created a political problem for the West as well. With NATO Allies imperiled by SS 20s That could not reach the mainland United States. They question the credibility The American extended nuclear deterrence, the idea that the United States would respond to a Soviet attack on Europe with its own nuclear weapons, and given the Soviet SS 20 build up in the late 1970s. NATO Allies were particularly worried that American policymakers might not risk Soviet retaliation against the United States to protect its allies from SS 20 strikes. Therefore, the Carter administration responded to the SS 20 build up with the dual track decision. It's a multilateral NATO program that called for US missile deployments in Europe, and simultaneous arms control talks with the Soviet Union. And it Jimmy Carter and his aides they believe that deploying US missiles to Europe would create new bargaining trips from an arms control perspective to trade for SS 20s and superpower arms talks. American missiles would also create new military options to deter and respond to SS 20s on the potential battlefield, in plain simple English, the Carter administration, it wanted to show that American nuclear deterrence extended nuclear deterrence remained credible.

Nice, nice. Thank you for the explanation. That makes sense. So we're talking about intermediate range nuclear missiles, the Ss 20s. That was part of this whole negotiation starting with Carter that resulted in the INF Treaty of 1987, which was a big, big deal. That was. you have in your book, the Secretary of State George Shultz, basically said that that was the beginning of the end of the Cold War, once that was signed, which is huge.

Yes.

You mentioned Carter, there's also Reagan obviously involved tell us the key moments that were instrumental in creating this plan, and some of the interesting research that you found regarding Carter and Reagan.

Yeah, and one of the things I think is interesting is that my sponsors, academics, they tend to express more interest in the second part of the book, which focuses on the Reagan administration, and my most meaningful contributions to historiography. They really deal with the Carter administration's approach to the gray area problem. Past academics and scholars painted President Jimmy Carter as an ineffective leader of the North Atlantic Alliance. They've been particularly critical of his theater nuclear policies, and most historians have credited West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt as the architect of the dual track decision. Even nuanced studies of the gray area problem they blame Carter and his aides for creating an accident basing crisis in Europe in the 1980s. And I disagree with the existing scholarship for several reasons. First, I spent a lot of time demonstrating that the Carter administration learned from what's called the neutron bomb saga, a precursor to transatlantic debate about us and this will deployments in Europe in 1977 1978. The Carter administration did not secure this from NATO allies to deploy the controversial and unpopular neutron bomb before they developed the device. Therefore, the misguided Western plan to trade the neutron bomb for SS 20s it unraveled at the 11th hour. In the future, US officials demanded firm European promises to deploy American missiles before asking Congress funds to develop those systems. Second, I argue that the Carter administration it shaped the deployment track the arms control approach and the relationship between the two tracks in the fundamental way. The dual track decision called the deployment of American ground based cruise missiles and Pershing two ballistic missiles in Europe, the exact two systems prescribed by US officials and transatlantic consultations in fall 1978. In contrast, the Schmidt government recommended deployment of sea based systems hoping to dodge it basing debate at home. The Carter administration demanded a simple exchange of apples for apples in an isolated forum that was limited to US and Soviet ground based intermediate range missiles. In contrast, NATO Allies they wanted to ran every nuclear weapon that could travel 1000 kilometers in to a single form and assault. And in addition, Allied officials embrace the US Army men in December 1979 that American missiles should be deployed in Europe, even if arms talks with Moscow went well. In contrast, NATO Allies wanted to cancel US missile deployments, if the Soviets were forthcoming in arms control negotiations. And third, the Carter administration placed its successor, the Reagan administration, in a stronger position during negotiations about inf by securing the dual track decision, the combination of low flying cruise missiles and high flying ballistic missiles, they were likely to overwhelm Soviet air defenses. This created an incentive for the Kremlin to engage in meaningful disarmament talks. The Reagan administration inherited bargaining chips growing arsenal of cruise and purchasing two missiles that simplified negotiations about inf of the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration, therefore, it could exchange apples for apples inf for inf in an isolated forum. And I think it's quite important to remember that the INF breakthrough occurred in spring 1987 When Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev accepted President Reagan's argument to pursue a separate ins deal.

Nice, nice. So it's interesting that you that you mentioned that your sponsors are more interested in Reagan than Carter. And I do get it on one hand, because, you know, Reagan gets the glory because he's, you know, they they finalize the agreement with Gorbachev, and you know, there they are signing it and things like that. But I'm just curious, why does Carter get such a bad rap? I know, I know that he was a single term president. But what are some of the other factors that kind of historians have kind of ignored Carter and you haven't? What's that?

Yeah, it's a great question. I think it's Andrew Young, who was President Carter's ambassador to the UN, he said Reagan, quote, sucked up all of Carter's successes, a big part of it is that Reagan is there at the end to sign this deal with Gorbachev. And that's able to give him credit. I think that alumni from the Reagan administration have also been more effective than their predecessors, at highlighting their achievements in international arms control in particular. And I think too, it's hard for people to shake the image of Carter as as a weak president. He's someone who was plagued by the Iran hostage. He couldn't get stagflation under control. He appeared oblivious when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, much of which was bad luck and had little to do with US policy. But yeah, it's a good question. I mean, that's my that's my basic take on why Carter does not get as much credit as Reagan.

Interesting, interesting. So now, we have the signing. And then obviously, I think was was trust and verify was that part of this job?

That is President Reagan's favorite Russian expression, he repeated ad nauseam to Gorbachev.

Okay, okay. So if they once you sign an agreement, then you have to live up to it, how we'll get to it unraveling, but I want to, like, from 1987 up until 2019. Once finally it gets broken. How effective was it that both sides pretty much do it and it was effective?

Yeah, so I write and I view the INF treaty as the gold standard of nuclear arms control deals from about 1987 When it gets signed until 2001. When the onsite inspection window closes, it is verified, it eliminates over 2600 missiles. It reflects the newfound trust between Washington and Moscow. And then you've highlighted what will eventually happen is that with on site inspections ending the Putin government began to violate the treaty in about 2011, which was sort of the first domino to fall in the agreement, eventually unraveling in 2019. But when it was signed, when it was implemented for about those 30 years, it was quite beneficial to Western security. It eliminated weapons that could cause utter destruction to US forces and allied forces and bases and NATO Europe in Eurasia. It was verified with unprecedented on site inspections, something that Reagan's predecessors to be quite blunt did not think was possible. So yeah, I view it is a quite a successful agreement given its short lifespan.

Okay. Okay. That's good to know. And yeah, I was surprised. I wasn't following it. But once it unraveled, and we stepped away from the treaty in 2019, I was I was sad. I was disappointed in literally there were it wasn't like it just was a hard break -there were things leading up to that. Tell us why the US and Russia decide, hey, we're done with that.

Yeah, that's, that's fantastic question. Um, and it was sort of a slow demise. But there are a couple of things that really triggered the end of the INF deal. Donald Trump, he withdrew the United States from the INF Treaty in August 2019. And he did so for several reasons. First, and most obvious the Russian government of President Vladimir Putin, they violated the INF treaty by deploying about 100 ssca cruise missiles in Europe associates our ground based missiles with approximate ranges of 2500 kilometers. It's an egregious violation of the INF Treaty. So that is the first piece of the puzzle. Second, the INF Treaty was a product of its time, it was a bilateral deal between the United States and the Soviet Union. It did not apply to the People's Republic of China. And since the late 1980s, Communist China has developed 1000s of dual capable missiles that impact us and allied forces and bases in the western Pacific. And third, personalities matter in history. And it matters who's sitting in the White House to make these decisions. President Barack Obama and his aides, they detected Russian non compliance with the INF treaty as early as 2011. But they did not withdraw from the treaty to retaliate against the Russians. President Donald Trump, he appears to have been unwilling to tolerate Russian cheating on arms deals. And you can see this with his approach agreements like the Open Skies treaty and new start as well. And equally important, it appears that Donald Trump viewed the INF treaty as a relic of the bipolar Cold War, since it did not apply to Communist China. And last the United States contributed to the demise of the INF Treaty two, in particular by developing and deploying us ballistic missile defenses to Europe. And those missile defenses they reawakened Russian fears about their second strike capabilities. Right now, the evidence appears to suggest that development of SSE eights, at least in part, was an effort to maintain Russia's ability to hit targets in NATO Europe. The Kremlin stated on numerous occasions, that American missile defenses they were a nefarious ruse for stationing offensive missiles close to its western border. For instance, Russian officials, They speculated that US missile defenses in Romania and Poland, they said they could be rewired to fire ground launched cruise missiles. That's an argument that US policymakers rejected but still contributed to the demise of the deal. And 2019. Okay,

Okay. That makes sense. Bringing in all the factors you mentioned, particularly China. That makes sense. So, obviously, we're in we're not necessarily in the Cold War, but it's feel like it's getting pretty cold here. With with Russia and China, there's talking about, you know, the invasion of Taiwan and another war. I mean, it's getting crazy. We need another INF like, is there any possibility of that coming anytime soon? Or are we just going down a dark road here?

Yeah. So in some ways, my, my manuscript can certainly be interpreted as holding out a ray of hope for a new inf type deal. But based on a lot of critical feedback, I think it's very important to have guarded optimism about that process. And also to recognize how different as you mentioned, the situation is in 2023, than it was in the late cold war. And there are a couple things that I think policymakers should be mindful of. Today, they're not going to be building on years of productive superpower arm Just negotiations, President Vladimir Putin, Ji Jinping, they're not Mikhail Gorbachev, who shared Reagan's dream of a world without nuclear weapons, the Chinese economy, it's also a lot stronger than the Soviet economy of the 1980s, which was a significant factor that appears to have encouraged Gorbachev to compromise on inf issues. And I think that given the number of states that possess inf type missiles today, I am doubtful that Moscow or Beijing are going to accept a US proposal to abolish inf anytime soon.

Okay, okay. Well, I'm always trying to embrace hope. So yeah. brings that and I encourage anyone to who's interested in arms control both as as a as a historical event with all the research that you've done, as well as the implications for potentially another agreement in the future. You said that the INF Treaty was the gold standard. That's, that's really good to know. And so for policymakers, please, please purchase and get and read Luke with this new book, Unraveling the Gray Area Problem: The United States and the INF Treaty. It was really great talking with you, Luke.

Yeah. Thanks a lot, Jonathan. I appreciate the opportunity to be on your podcast. I appreciate the opportunity to advertise my book.

Sure, of course, of course, we are proud to be publishing it, and again, hope that it gets in the hands of policymakers who can really make a difference. That was Luke Griffith, author of Unraveling the Gray Area Problem: The United States and the INF Treaty. If you'd like to read Luke's new book, please use the promo code 09POD on our website at Cornell press.cornell.edu to save 30% on the new book. If you live in the UK, use the discount code CSANNOUNCE and visit the website combined academic.co.uk Thank you for listening to 1869, The Cornell University Press podcast.