I think the most compelling example that's recent is the rules that require this extra secrecy for the big tech firms with respect to algorithms and source code, which got rolled into a UK EU agreement. And as a result, the European Union's AI Act, which has the same things that all the US proposals have for its sensitive uses of AI pre screening, to make sure that the algorithm is not going to cause harms that had to rollback, the scope of the law and how much pre screening you can do because you couldn't do the algorithmic assessments. There are the basis for all of the US civil rights and civil liberties, online regulations and or the AI rules and the AI, for instance, executive order that the administration has put forward. So that's one that's a live example from nine months ago of the conflict. But I want to actually talk about the balance question, because I think the way Simon put it is, is right, whenever you're writing these kinds of trade rules, and Jonathan wrote the US MCA rules, he was the lead negotiator, you figure out what the obligation is the commitment, and then you think about, you need exceptions. And so both pieces of those have to have balance. And so the issue is not, I think Jonathan is exactly right, the interest of the US and that we said the same thing is open Internet. Excellent. That's the right interest. The question is, what specific rules are we going to have in these instruments? And do they take into consideration the range of interests of consumers for national security, etc. And so what the administration has done is they have stepped back from one set of rules that have been tabled that they think don't do that. Now, now, we may have special insights to the interagency process has been going on for the last six months to write new rules, because that's what happened, they stood back from the old ones, they did not walk away. In fact, the joint statement initiative is going to finally get done. Because the deadlock that had been happening because the US had stuck to the Extreme Rules has broken, they've put the controversial issues in the side, they're actually going to harvest an initial WTO agreement, which has been stuck since 2019. So the US is in the middle of that the US is still at the table. Back home in Washington, there's been this interagency process to figure out if we don't like those, then what should the new approach be that actually gives us space. And that's the difference between the interest and the rules. So the sort of notion of where USTR is moving towards. It's where the US government is moving towards, across different agencies. And Congress, obviously, will have a say about how you accommodate the policy space. Now, some of these Canadian measures that have passed, it depends on the specific elements of the laws. So for people here who are with members of Congress, your bosses have co sponsored a whole bunch of particular measures on privacy, competition, policy, online civil rights, we did a report you can see on our website, which is rethink trade.org, where we actually did side by sides. And we took all of those major bills, and then we show you, here's the US MCA language. And here's where the conflict could be. And we went through more than a dozen bills to actually show with conflict is Canada's bills may or may not have the instruments that are the same mechanisms, or the same policies that we're trying to implement here. But you had, you know, ad House members, including all the ranking members, sending a letter to the trade, Ambassador to the president, praising what the ambassador is doing, and saying, Hey, we need the policy space. That's the letter that just got circulated. So you gotta love members of Congress for sponsoring these bills, who thinks there's a problem. The last thing I would just note is, and I keep mentioning this EU policy, this is for the interest of an open Internet. This is their version that's also on the table in Geneva, which Jonathan and his companies don't like. But I think this is not bad. The parties are committed to ensuring cross border data flows to facilitate trade in the digital economy and recognize that each party may have its own regulatory requirements in this regard. To that end, a party shall not I eat binding, restrict cross border data flows taking place between the parties, the countries in the context of activity that isn't with the scope of this chapter, that's defined quite widely as cross as basically activities on the internet, requiring the use of computing facilities or network elements in the territory for data processing, you can't do that, requiring the localization of data and its territory, you can't do that prohibiting storage or processing of data and the territory, you can't do that. It's a whole list of things you cannot do that are forced localization. And then there's an exception for privacy. And it's an exception that actually works as compared to the one that was net usmca language. So you know, again, if I had a magic wand, and I was trying to get the balance, right, I would head for something closer to this. Now, this won't work for your guys Data Broker law that you just passed unanimously, three weeks ago, we would need a different exception added the EU is focused on privacy. We're thinking more about data security lately, but you could take that ban on force localization activity, add a working exception for data security to the one and privacy and you would have fixed that particular rule. Get some of the other ones I also have fixes Laurie