1869, Ep. 139 with Paul Robinson, author of Russian Liberalism

7:38PM Oct 10, 2023

Speakers:

Jonathan Hall

Paul Robinson

Keywords:

liberal

liberalism

people

russian

russia

liberalisation

tended

state

conservatism

institutions

conservative

liberalizing

political

reasons

call

putin

values

book

huge

russian parliament

Welcome to 1869, The Cornell University Press Podcast. I'm Jonathan Hall. This episode we speak with Paul Robinson, author of the new book Russian Liberalism, now available in hardcover, paperback, and ebook from Northern Illinois University Press. Paul Robinson is a professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. He is the author of Russian Conservatism, and Grand Duke, Nikolai Nikolaevich. We spoke to Paul about what defines liberalism in the Russian context, why liberalism has historically failed to take root in Russia, and the impact the war in Ukraine may have on Russia's potential political trajectory. Hello, Paul, welcome to the podcast.

Hello, Jonathan. Thank you for having me on.

Well, it's a pleasure, and I'm very interested in talking to you about your new book, Russian Liberalism, which is a follow up to your earlier book from 2019, Russian Conservatism. And that earlier book, Russian Conservatism was widely praised by many, including the Times Literary Supplement of the UK, and they gave it they gave a glowing review. And they had this great line, "Defining Russian conservatism is a bit like putting a jellyfish into a box." And then they went on to say that you were able to fully accomplish this difficult task describing and defining Russian conservatism. But reading your new book, it sounds like you have a very similar challenge. This is one of the lines from your book, Russian Liberalism, "The term liberalism encompasses a huge variety of different viewpoints, many of which appear to be entirely contradictory. This puts the student of liberalism in a difficult position, on the one hand, its existence and importance cannot be denied. On the other hand, it is not at all clear what it is." So this is a huge task. You've written a whole book, you've written two books on both polarities, could you tell us in broad brushstrokes, what conservatism is, and liberalism is in the Russian context?

Yeah, I mean having written two books about titles, I sort of increasingly come to the conclusion. But perhaps the terminology we use to describe political theory is not very good. We have these terms like liberalism and conservatism, which date back, you know, a couple of 100 years and perhaps don't really do describe things very well, particularly as time has moved on. And so what they meant once is not necessarily what what they mean now, and what they mean in one country is not necessarily what they mean in another country. So the difference between, say, classical liberalism, and what nowadays people often referred to as liberal is, is quite striking. And in many cases, if you look at it in a Russian context, it's even more complicated, because it's wrapped up to a certain degree with concepts of westernization, and anti nationalization as well. So, I mean, in my book on conservatism, I describe conservatism as being a ideology of organic change. So that's to say conservatives, aren't all necessarily opposed to change of all sorts, but they do think change should be gradual, and in accordance with existing national institutions and culture and traditions and values, and so on. Whereas, and that is actually not incompatible with liberalism, you can be a conservative liberal, you can you can believe in liberal values of liberal institutions, but think that this is something you should be moving towards, in a gradual way, and doing so in a manner which is, you know, coherent with existing institutions and values for your country so that you have your own national form of liberalism, as it worked. So liberalism and conservatism are not necessarily direct opposites. You can be a conservative liberal, liberal conservative, liberalism implies adherence to certain key values, and institutions, which are the institutions which can affect put those values into operation. So the key values would be things such as liberty will be the primary one. But some people would also say, you know, equality, for instance, and some others, but not every liberal agrees with that. And then there's the institutions which put that into effect, which is things such as, you know, representative government, free markets, free trade, the rule of law, and so on. Right. If you can believe in all that and be a conservative, so you are not necessarily opposed to one that will, because what is conservative in one country might not be conservative in our country, because different countries have different institutions. So if you live in a liberal society and you are conservative or when you're when you're a liberal, that's what you're trying to preserve. Now in the Russian context, and so this is all muddled up by the big issue of westernization, because these values and institutions associated with liberalism have been associated generally with Western Europe, and then more, more generally, what we call the West, whatever, whatever that should be, therefore, to be a liberal, has often meant to be a westernized, and that is to say, to take the view that Russia should become like the West, whatever that may be. Whereas to be a conservative has been become to say, No, that's taking a foreign model, we should evolve according to, you know, our own culture and values and institutions, which therefore tend to push you into an anti-westernizing camp. Not not necessarily, I mean, that means a result of hard and fast categories. But as a result, we in a Russian context, we don't think liberalism, and conservatism has to suddenly be been a cultural one, rather than so much as a political one. And it's about what sort of culture Russia should be. Should it be westernizing? Should it not is history, as it generally is considered invest in liberal thought, marching inexorably towards you know, the end of history? Or is history involved diverging forms, each going in their own direction? So the conservatives would probably take the latter position and liberals would take the former.

Interesting, interesting. Yeah, that is very slippery, the old definition, because as you're saying, it can be in different contexts and in a different country, the definitions can be completely different. But in particular, with Russia, you say that there are kind of three areas and you mentioned this earlier. There's cultural liberalism, political liberalism, and social economic liberalism. Could you kind of parse those out a little bit?

Yes. So cultural liberalism would be largely concerned with westernization. Though not entirely it is also concerned with how you'd identify the Russian nation. So it's to do with nation building, Russia's place in the world, and so on, and so forth. And also, it has tended to reflect the culture of the sort of, I'd say, professional elites who tend to have made up Russian liberals. So Russian liberals have tended to be a very narrow social group, it's largely been an intellectual movement. And interest, therefore tended to reflect the culture and values of that particular group of people. political liberalism would be issues such as establishing the rule of law, representative government and democracy. And then socio economic levels. And that's when we get into issues of what sort of economic system you want to have. Do you want to have a free market? How much of a free market what degree of state regulation Do you want to have, and of course, across this, these three different categories, which are not entirely separated from UK, but some overlap, you can be a liberal in one and not a liberal another. So you could be a free market liberal, but be against, you know, democracy and representative institutions, and be what you might call a liberal authoritarian, if you believe that people are dead set against economic reform, and often liberals have attended to this view, but the people are reactionary, right. And therefore, you're you don't want to have democracy because the people are reactionary, and it's not going to be good if I were in charge. Or you could be a political liberal, and believe in the rule of law of representative institutions and civil liberties and all that, but at the same time, not be particularly economically liberal, you might believe at the state, you wouldn't be a socialist, you know, but even still control the means of production. But at the same time, you might believe in a very large role of the state in managing the economy, which will therefore take you some some degree away from classical liberalism and economic regard. So it's quite rare to find someone who's a liberal across the whole spectrum.

That makes sense. That makes sense. Interesting. So now, liberalism is not doing very well in Russia and in historically hasn't either. There's been a couple of times where it did come to the forefront. But one of the big questions your book tackles is: Why has liberalism failed to take root in Russia? And it's associated in the popular mind with division and economic and social collapse. Why is liberalism viewed is such a negative manner? And why has it failed to take root in Russia?

Well, one reason, of course, is that the state has generally not wanted it to take root. So it has been operating in a much hostile political environment. And that's been historically the case in most periods of Russia history. And the stage itself has tended to take the lead in liberalizing Russian society, but for reasons which are somewhat divorced from liberal theory and more to do with the state deciding but some degree of liberalisation is in the interest of the state. But that's not the same as wanting to allow, you know, the liberals to be in charge. Right. So So I mean, it's been it's been a hostile environment. This the second reason, if you look particularly well, in the imperial period, liberals were seen in many circles as being sort of woolly and weak and not sufficiently radical. So So liberalism was like, it was a kind of a dirty word for people who are sort of lily livered, and so on and so forth, so So even liberals didn't call themselves liberals, they tended to call themselves constitutionalists. In the post Soviet period, the problem has been, liberalism is very much associated with the economic and social chaos, which took place in the 1990s. And one could argue that there were certain achievements of that period. But for most Russians, that sort of lived experience was a very negative one, there was hyperinflation, there was massive increase in crime and corruption, and social disorders such as drunkenness, drug use, declining social services, demographic collapse, huge drop in life expectancy. And because this was a period of liberal reform, in the minds of, you know, many people, therefore, you know, this is evidence that liberals are already not to be trusted with power, and they tend to be associated with chaos, and so on and so forth. Another problem which has bedeviled liberals in the past few decades has been their association with Western ism. So as I mentioned, in a in a Russian context, liberalism is associated with this idea that Russia should become like the West, but as tensions, political tensions between Russia and the rest have got worse and worse, this has created the impression that liberals are a sort of anti national force, no, the liberals would argue, but it is not anti patriotic to resist the government, which is leading the country through it. Now, it'd be their argument. But it's an argument on an argument which sells to most people. And when you got to events, such as the use of the annexation of Crimea, which most liberals opposed, they clearly put themselves in opposition to, to the bulk of the people and have suffered as a consequence. And when another factor is, historically has been, as I said, But liberalism has tended to be associated with a very narrow strata of Russian intellectual society. So in the imperial period tended to be professors, lawyers, doctors, that sort of people who profess the liberal cause. And there are very, very few representatives among you know, workers and peasants, for instance. And we just didn't really speak the language of ordinary people. And this This is kind of remain the case. Here after and there's quite a quite a social rift, one might say, between liberals and what generally called ordinary people, which I know is a somewhat arbitrary category. And indeed, there's even something of a suspicion of ordinary people on modern liberals who pretend to look down on them, as you know, a reactionary tainted by the Soviet legacy of Homo Sovieticus, and so on. And well, you know, if you disparage people wage disparity back. So this, this has been another this has been another problem. And in recent years, I think,

Wow I mean, you mentioned the ordinary person. There's a great quote that you have in the book. You say in a 2019 interview, Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked, "The liberal idea has become obsolete. It has come into conflict with the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population." So it doesn't seem like liberalism is going to emerge organically--we talked about organic change--anytime soon. You know, even you know, if we had a crystal ball, 25 years, 50 years do you see within the vicissitudes of history that liberalism could ever come back in a meaningful way? Or is or is Russia really on a conservative track for the foreseeable future?

Well, I don't like trying to predict because it's so easy to get it wrong. And something may happen, you know, the war in Ukraine might go horribly wrong or something. And, you know, I mean, we just, we just can't tell. But I think there's some, one might say, objective reasons why certain liberal values and institutions do develop as societies develop. And, you know, even today, Russia is a more liberal society when it was 100 years ago. Right. So it is not as if liberalism has made no progress and even under Putin has been liberalization in certain regards elements and some in criminal justice system. So Russia 20 years ago, had one of the point it still has one of the highest prison populations in the world. But it was better in the United States. 20 years ago, since then, the number of people in Russian prisons has been reduced by at least half probably probably more. Right? So because they've liberalized their criminal justice system with decriminalized things, they've reduced sentences, and so on and so forth. There's been some liberalisation in labor legislation in allowing, there was Soviets had huge restrictions, a number of jobs women can do, but those have been reduced and stuff like this. So you can get liberalisation. In some sectors, while in other sectors such as say, you might say, political sector, where there's clearly been a clamp down on freedom of expression. And the past few years, there's been a de liberalisation, but that doesn't mean that liberalism, liberal institutions and ideas have vanished. Right. You know, modern Russia is still a more liberal place from Brezhnev's Soviet Union, or certainly Stalin's Soviet Union, right. So it's not all backward, it's just, it's not, when I say a liberal movement has been has been crushed. Right. And for progress across the board has become more difficult. And certainly more conservative trends have been introduced in society now and will be to continue. But I think a lot may depend on the international situation. If as seems likely with the war in Ukraine goes on a long time and ends in some sort of stalemate, then sanctions will remain on Russia for the indefinite future. And Russia and the West will be mutually isolated for decades. Right. And in that context, promoting, you know, what, what the West is promoting as Western as liberal values may be very difficult and more conservative. trend will, will continue. So I think a lot depends on the international situation.

We both grew up during the Cold War. There's, there was a sense that there were certain times certainly in the 80s, where it felt like this whole thing could spill over. And then there was Perestroika, there was there was some detente, there was a lessening of the aggressiveness between the two factions. Be at this, this this now this war in Ukraine. If and when the war is over? Are there any opportunities for a conservative Russia being not necessarily ally us, but when is this conflict gonna end? I mean, it seems like it's been like decades long conflict. The first one, the Soviet Union, we were allies in World War Two, but then, you know, pretty soon we have the Cold War. Is there any gonna be a time where people are going to be able to be more less aggressive and more accepting of one another? Or is it is this just the nature of, of politics and nation states?

I'm not personally optimistic. But I don't I don't want to say for sure, because, you know, thinks stuff can happen. I didn't. I didn't think we'd be where we are today. If you'd asked me five years ago, we're going to be in a situation I said, I said, I just said it's possible, but I don't think likely.

As far as the war in Ukraine.

Yeah. It's potentially, like i i tend, I tend to the view, that it's, we may be heading for some sort of Korean scenario where you have a ceasefire and no peace. And when the barriers remain in place, we're very under mutual suspicions remain in place for a very, very, very long time. And as I said in within, if that is the international political context, then the prospects for domestic rational liberalism can be difficult because if rational liberalism retains its association with Westerners than if as a position of permanent conflict between Russia and the West when when Russian liberalism is simply not going to be in a position to get anywhere, because it will just be suppressed by the state as an enemy and propagandized by the state as an enemy, and most people will probably accept that. So if if that proves to be the context, and it may not be, but if it does, then Russian liberalism will have to find some, some new, some new approach. Now, there was a nice quote, I put in the book from a guy called Alexander Tsipko, who's not Soviet journalist, I think he's still alive. And he said, Russia, the problem isn't people who value freedom don't value tradition, and people who value tradition, nobody freedom. And they've never really been able to find some way to make on national liberalism, which one at the set one point is promoting liberal institutions, but young their hand is deemed acceptable by the state and by the mass of the people as a as a patriotic force. And that's, that's been a problem.

Interesting. One last thing. We've been talking about the war in Ukraine, what do you again, we don't want to necessarily predict the future, but what's the best case scenario /worst case scenario?

Worst case scenario would be civil war in Russia. Wow. I don't think that's very likely. That would be a worst case scenario. Right. And, and, you know, there are much more reactionary forces and Putin. So, best case scenario? I don't I don't want to say because like, it depends on how you define best, right? I mean, because like, what what say Western liberals would say would be the best case scenario, and even many Russian themselves would say the best case scenario would be a collapse of the existing state, which would then allow for a, a liberal revival. But in my own mind, I can't really see how the collapse of the existing state is the void is going to be filled by liberals, because they don't have, well there's a parallel you can draw with 1917. So when the Czar advocated in 1917, initially, liberals took power. I mean, they were thrown out fairly rapidly by by the Bolsheviks. But initially, they took power. I mean, they took power, because A, they had a well established political set of political institutions, such as the cadet party, they had places in in the Russian parliament, and then formed an alliance in the Russian Parliament worked with other groups. They'd been working on supplying the army with roof supplies. So they had a network of contacts with with the Russian generals, high command, and what were deemed acceptable by the military, as people to be in charge. And therefore they were when the Czar advocated, they were able in a position to to take over. Now these things simply are not the case today. There is no established Liberal Party of any magnitude whatsoever. There are, I think, two members of the Russian parliament who could possibly be deemed liberal. And they're both -- one is Civic Platform, one is the so called party Party of Growth, but you know, very much status liberals. And there's something called the New People Party, which you might maybe call them very sort of soft liberals, but there's no real established liberal institutions. They don't have great networks of support among the people. They don't have any. They're not regarded as a patriotic force, they certainly don't have like networks of contacts with the high command where the military would support them. So how they would take control in essence, in that instance, I don't see it would almost certainly have to be some sort of technocratic government. Now. So therefore, the the best way forward might be if you're talking MSOs, like technocratic government, which were technocratic reasons, decides that some form of liberalisation is necessary. And this is historically what has happened. So after the merciless defeat in the Crimean War, the Russian state decided that serfdom had to go because it just you it couldn't meet the needs of the army for people and it was holding back the economy and preventing Russia industrializing a whole bunch of reasons that they decided that you know, things are gonna change. And then that led because you got rid of one institution even had to start changing some other institutions. So you get a liberalisation from the top large be led by what are called enlightened bureaucrats, largely for conservative reasons in that they want to stop something like the Crimean war happening again, and they want to strengthen the state and for that needs a degree of liberalization. Same thing happens in Perestroika. Gorbachev is not a classical liberal, he's a communist. He believes in socialism with a human face. And he really believes that you can have communism, you know, but a nice communism. And he's driven by this belief that, you know, things are just not working. Right. There's a lot of corruption. The economy is slowing down. It's, there's obviously huge inefficiencies. And he thinks that by liberalizing, you'll be able to galvanize people's energy, and therefore strength from the state, which turns out to be wrong, but it's it's that sort of top down technocratic thinking which tends to drive reform in Russia, historically speaking, rather than liberalisation driven by liberals. Okay, which has happened probably once, which is then for a couple of years in the early 1990s. So should you know, when Putin will die eventually, right? I mean, you know, at that point, the Russian state may begin to think but, you know, we need to break out of our political isolation, and we need to liberalize things because it's holding us back and so on. So

interesting, interesting. Well, thank you, Paul. It was great talking with you. I really appreciate you taking the time to come onto the podcast. I encourage all listeners to get his new book, Russian Liberalism, as well as if you want to get the full understanding of Russian politics, I would also encourage you to get his earlier book from 2019 If you don't have it, Russian Conservatism. Paul, thank you so much. It was it was a pleasure talking with you.

My pleasure. Thank you.

That was Paul Robinson, author of the new book Russian Liberalism, now available in hardcover, paperback, and ebook from Northern Illinois University Press. If you'd like to purchase Paul's new book, use the promo code 09POD to save 30% on our website at Cornell press.cornell.edu. If you live in the UK, use the discount code CSANNOUNCE and visit the website at combined academic.co.uk. Thank you for listening to 1869, The Cornell University Press Podcast